Re: [OAUTH-WG] A few comments on draft-ietf-oauth-rar-01

Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> Wed, 08 July 2020 14:40 UTC

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From: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 10:40:27 -0400
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To: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] A few comments on draft-ietf-oauth-rar-01
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The two-phase approach is exactly what OBUK does, where you get one access token using client credentials before getting a more specific one in context of the user’s consent. This ends up being awkward to implement at best, since OAuth involves the user too early in the process to allow for this kind of thing. PAR might help address this dichotomy, but RAR can provide places for this to fill in.

With XYZ, I tried to design for that kind of multi-stage transaction pattern more explicitly, with the idea that you could continue your request in context and vary it over time, or even start a new request in the context of an existing one. This is something that I intend to continue with the soon-to-be-formed GNAP working group, if you want to bring this use case there.

 — Justin

> On Jul 6, 2020, at 12:32 PM, Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com> wrote:
> 
> I’m reading draft-ietf-oauth-rar-01 in a bit more detail now I have some time, and I have a few comments.
> 
> An assumption in the draft appears to be that the client knows ahead of time what it wants to gain access to and can describe it in detail. For example, the last example in section 2.1 is a client requesting access to particular files, which assumes that the client already knows the paths of the files it wants to access. This in turn seems to imply that the client already has some level of access to be able to determine this, e.g. to list directories, which may not be desirable. In many cases like this I think it’s more natural for the client to not know exactly what it is asking for but instead to want access to *some* file, chosen by the user. An example of this is the Dropbox Chooser [1] and Saver [2] APIs, which notably are not built on top of OAuth. In these cases it would be more natural for the client to send a more generic request and for the details to be filled in by the user as part of the consent process.
> 
> Another issue is that as far as I can see in the current draft, any client can initiate a rich authorization request at any time without any kind of prior approval. This seems problematic for the main example in the draft, i.e. payment initiation. As an attacker, if I can get a consent screen up on a user’s device requesting to move money around then it seems like half my job is already done - some fraction of users will probably approve such a transaction without properly checking it. It feels like the ability to ask for transaction approval should already be a privileged operation that should require consent and approval.
> 
> A related issue is that each approval is in effect a completely isolated incident. In a normal OAuth2 interaction I would grant an app some longish-term access to data and it would get an access token and optionally a refresh token. At some later point I can go to the AS and see that I have granted this access and revoke it if I choose. With RAR there is no representation of a long-term relationship between the RO and the client and each transaction starts from fresh. Again, this seems potentially problematic and not quite in keeping with how OAuth currently operates. Each grant of access is ephemeral. (Do refresh tokens make sense in the context of RAR?)
> 
> I think a better approach would be a two-phase authorization process:
> 
> 1. In step 1 an app gets a normal long-lived access and/or refresh token that grants it permissions to ask to initial transactions (RARs) - e.g. with scope initiate_payments
> 2. In step 2 the app requests authorization for individual RARs/transactions using some proof of its grant from step 1
> 
> I have ideas for how this could be achieved, but I’d prefer to see what others think of this general idea rather than getting bogged down in specific details.
> 
> [1]: https://www.dropbox.com/developers/chooser <https://www.dropbox.com/developers/chooser>
> [2]: https://www.dropbox.com/developers/saver <https://www.dropbox.com/developers/saver> 
> 
> — Neil
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