Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT access tokens and the revocation endpoint

vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com Tue, 06 October 2020 21:53 UTC

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From: <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>
To: "'Andrii Deinega'" <andrii.deinega@gmail.com>, <oauth@ietf.org>
References: <a5b45629-c770-2294-4277-73801fff1857@babelouest.org> <13035645-B875-48E5-80DC-C1FD401423E2@manicode.com> <060901d69c26$ba2deab0$2e89c010$@auth0.com> <CALkShct4=DPHygj5ECSuDo09xA4H73SDnjXycbZi3L+ktjZDVA@mail.gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 14:53:32 -0700
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT access tokens and the revocation endpoint
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Hi Andrii,

Thanks for the thoughtful comments! Here’s my 2 c.

 

On the proposed language: given that the JWT AT profile is just providing more details on the content of an AT, making JWT ATs a proper subset of all ATs, readers should have no reason to believe that introspection or any other existing spec discussing AT behavior should operate differently. That assumption holds for everything across the board, hence it would be a bit odd to call out this particular case. On the userinfo case, I would find it even more left field to say anything about it.
If we do reach a consensus on specific revocation practices that apply to JWT ATs specifically, and we conclude that they should live in this document, I will be happy to add language accordingly.

 

On the AJWT: I hear you on the dissonance that JWT AT carries, but I am very hesitant to introduce new acronyms to an already crowded/impenetrable domain.
JWT access token might not roll off the tongue, but at this point ‘JWT’ is nearly a proprietary eponym and the expression “JWT token” is extraordinarily common in literature, a quick google query will give you the full measure of the phenomenon, hence I think we’ll be OK with the current form.

Cheers,

V.

 

From: Andrii Deinega <andrii.deinega@gmail.com> 
Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2020 2:25 PM
To: vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com; oauth@ietf.org
Cc: Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com>om>; Nicolas Mora <nicolas@babelouest.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT access tokens and the revocation endpoint

 

Vittorio and WG,

 

Would it be possible to include something like the following to https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-10


In case the authorization server exposes the introspection, revocation, and OpenID Connect userinfo endpoints they MUST act in the same way as it happens with a regular access token. That allows the AS to change the type of an access token on the fly and that won’t lead to interoperate issues. Plus, the consumers of these endpoints use them regardless of the type of access token.

 

The way how the AS can notify RSs that the token revocation event happened (if it decides to do so) is completely left to implementers.

 

?

 

Another minor editorial thing from me is it would possible to change and refer to "JWT access tokens" as AJWT. Thus, this document won't repeat the token word twice.

 

Regards,

Andrii

 

On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 2:22 PM <vittorio.bertocci=40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org <mailto:40auth0.com@dmarc.ietf.org> > wrote:

Hey Jim, regarding
> Every logout event should trigger token revocation
That isn’t necessarily the case. An access token represents the ability of a client to access a given resource; the fact that it requires an authentication transaction/session establishment to be issued to the client does not mean that the AT lifetime is tied to the lifetime of that session. Say that I allow LinkedIn to tweet on my behalf. Once I have done that, it doesn’t matter whether I stay logged in their web app or otherwise. Even if I log out of the session in which context I got my twitter AT, I can still post on LinkedIn from my native LinkedIn app and the corresponding post will show up on twitter as well.
Now, one might choose to *explicitly* tie tokens lifetime to originating sessions lifetime, see the discussion on the OpenID Connect group about a possible online_access scope for influencing RTs and Ats (in particular, in the context of SPAs) but that's additional semantic that isn’t defined today.

-----Original Message-----
From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org> > On Behalf Of Jim Manico
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 5:17 PM
To: Nicolas Mora <nicolas@babelouest.org <mailto:nicolas@babelouest.org> >
Cc: oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org> 
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT access tokens and the revocation endpoint

> In this model, considering that token revocations don't happen a lot...

Just a brief note, a secure piece of software makes the logout feature prominent. Every logout event should trigger token revocation.

I’m mentioning this because a lot of OAuth solutions in the mobile space literally ignore the logout event, such as Facebook’s mobile OAuth solution. 

- Jim

> On Oct 4, 2020, at 6:55 AM, Nicolas Mora <nicolas@babelouest.org <mailto:nicolas@babelouest.org> > wrote:
> 
> Hello,
> 
>> Le 20-10-04 à 11 h 27, Thomas Broyer a écrit :
>> 
>>    There might be some kind of pushed events between the AS and the RS when
>>    a JWT AT is revoked, to allow the RS not to introspect a JWT AT at all.
>>    Like this, the RS knows if a JWT AT has been revoked or not.
>> 
>> 
>> If there are some kind of pushed events between the AS and the RS, 
>> then it could push the revoked (and/or expired) opaque AT too, giving 
>> almost no advantage to JWT ATs.
>> 
> Not necessarily, let's say the AS informs the RS only of the revoked 
> ATs, when a RS checks an AT, it verifies the signature first, then the 
> claims, then checks if the AT has been revoked by checking its 
> internal list filled by the AS pushed events.
> 
> In this model, considering that token revocations don't happen a lot, 
> the ratio revoked AT/valid AT is very low, so the advantage of a JWT 
> is important, because it means not so much communication between the 
> AS and the RSs, and a very reliable AT.
> 
> But this means a communication mechanism that isn't standardized yet.
> 
> /Nicolas
> 
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