Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?

"Zeltsan, Zachary (Zachary)" <zachary.zeltsan@alcatel-lucent.com> Mon, 15 March 2010 18:08 UTC

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From: "Zeltsan, Zachary (Zachary)" <zachary.zeltsan@alcatel-lucent.com>
To: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2010 13:07:25 -0500
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?
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My highlights of the points raised on this thread are as follows:

A Client needs to sign a request for the temporary credentials to:
* Authenticate to the server
* Provide means for ensuring that a request has not been modified

A Client needs to sign a request for the token credentials to:
* Ensure that of all the legitimate Clients only the Client authorized by the Resource Owner can access the resource
* Provide means for ensuring that a request has not been modified

If a request is signed with the client's private key it can be used for providing non-repudiation; an alternative solution for non-repudiation would require involvement of a third party.

There are use cases where non-repudiation is needed.

TLS protects only a session, not the data that need to be re-used later. Unless the whole session has been recorded and its key has been stored, the TLS does not provide non-repudiation.

It appears that there is a consensus in UMA community that signing should remain an option for enabling authentication and auditing.

There are use cases for which performance of a TLS-based solution would be worse than that of the signature-based solution.

The signatures are widely used for providing security over the insecure channels in today's implementations. There is a view that the signature-based method should remain an option for providing security over an insecure channel.

Zachary

-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Peter Saint-Andre
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2010 10:20 PM
To: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures, Why?

<hat type='chair'/>

On 3/4/10 1:00 PM, Blaine Cook wrote:
> One of the things that's been a primary focus of both today's WG call
> and last week's call is what are the specific use cases for
> signatures?
>
> - Why are signatures needed?
> - What do signatures need to protect?
>
> Let's try to outline the use cases! Please reply here, so that we have
> a good idea of what they are as we move towards the Anaheim WG.

This was a valuable thread. Perhaps someone could write up a summary of
the points raised, either on the list or at the wiki?

Peter

--
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/