Re: Mandatory Algorithm Changes?

[Edwin Woudt <[e-mail]>]

--On 8-2-2005 9:42 -0800 Jon Callas <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> I almost cringe to suggest this, but I will.
>
> Triple-DES is pretty much obsolete. Yesterday, I saw that NIST announced
> they're moving to stronger hashes.
>
> Does anyone object to changing the MUST cipher to AES (I'd pick 128) and
> MUST hash to SHA-256?

Regarding SHA-256: would that mean switching to SHA-256 for key 
fingerprints as well? (shouldn't v5 keys be introduced then?) And use 
SHA-256 for MDC packets?

Or is it just adding a MUST implement, so applications can use SHA-256 for 
document signatures with RSA keys only? (as DSA forces one to use SHA-1 
anyway)

IMHO, the first is what should be done at some point, but that's a really 
big change: all implementations out there need to be upgraded. Wouldn't 
that conflict with getting the current draft on standards track?

I do not see the point of the second option: as long as keys are only 
protected by a 160 bit figerprint, there is not much point protecting 
document signatures with longer hashes. It may be harder to generate a 
collision resulting in a valid key, then it is to generate a collision 
resulting in just some other random document, but I do not think it is wise 
to count on such an assumption.

-- 
Edwin