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Re: [openpgp] v5 interoperability

Andrew Gallagher <andrewg@andrewg.com> Wed, 03 April 2024 10:08 UTC

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From: Andrew Gallagher <andrewg@andrewg.com>
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Date: Wed, 03 Apr 2024 11:08:17 +0100
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To: Daniel Huigens <d.huigens=40protonmail.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] v5 interoperability
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On 3 Apr 2024, at 10:54, Daniel Huigens <d.huigens=40protonmail.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> On Wednesday, April 3rd, 2024 at 11:40, Andrew Gallagher wrote:
>> But can I serve such a v5-subpacket key indiscriminately, and trust that non-librepgp clients will silently ignore the subkey, or do I have to strip it myself before serving it, in case a client will treat the v5 subkey as invalidating the primary?
> 
> Since the crypto refresh considers them noncompliant, I don't think we
> can guarantee anything about how non-librepgp implementations should/
> would handle them.
...
> Whether that means you should strip subkeys, or just warn the uploader
> that the key might not be compatible with all implementations, I'm not
> sure, though.

One solution might be to require clients to state what they support when requesting keys over HKP. Or we could specifically say that HKP clients MUST silently ignore any unknown/mismatching subkey versions IFF they supply ?v=1, otherwise they get stripped keys. Or we could serve two keys over HKP, one stripped and one not...

A

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