Re: Diffs for next draft
Jon Callas <jon@callas.org> Thu, 23 August 2001 18:56 UTC
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From: Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
Subject: Re: Diffs for next draft
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Late last night, I replied to Werner, not to the list. Here's my reply to him, and his reply to me (with permission). Jon To: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> From: Jon Callas <jon@callas.org> Subject: Re: Diffs for next draft In our last episode ("Re: Diffs for next draft", shown on 8/23/01), Werner Koch said: >On Wed, 22 Aug 2001 15:52:12 -0700, Jon Callas said: > >> Here's everything I have. If there's something you want me to do and I've >> been obtuse, let me know again, and it'll get in. I'm planning on > >Did someone else also checked that the OIDs for SHA-xxx are correct? > I haven't, myself. I'll put that on my list. >I am a little bit curious, can you give a rational why the feature >flags are not bit encoded? > No. A byte vector seemed like a reasonable thing. I suppose we can do a bit vector. Does anyone else have an opinion. >What about the Klima/Rosa attack? If this draft is going to be the >next RFC we should do something about it. IIRC, we had not much >discussion about it. The obvious fix would be use a hash instead of >the simple checksum. The problem is how to indicate the use of this >new format. > >The correct solution would be to introduce a version 5 of the secret >key packet - this is a major change as we may also want to also >introduce a v5 public key packet for symmetry reasons. I guess this >will break a lot of code. > >The hackish solution is to define a new S2K type identical to type 3 >(iterated and salted) which would then trigger the use of the new >SHA-1 checksum. It should be made clear that this S2K type is only to >be used for the protection of the secret key and not for conventional >encryption. > >I don't like any of these solutions but the latter one is easier to >implement. Any other ideas? Let's put this on the list of things to do after this draft for the next one. John wants to push to a new RFC. Here are three open issues. Jon To: Jon Callas <jon@callas.org> Subject: Re: Diffs for next draft From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> Organisation: g10 Code GmbH X-PGP-KeyID: 621CC013 X-Request-PGP: finger://wk@g10code.com Date: 23 Aug 2001 10:00:48 +0200 Lines: 25 Jon, [It seems that you didn't post to the list.] On Thu, 23 Aug 2001 00:26:17 -0700, Jon Callas said: > No. A byte vector seemed like a reasonable thing. I suppose we can do a bit > vector. Does anyone else have an opinion. I have no problem with that, it is just that other attributes use bit vectors. Let's keep it as it is. Can we start to use it and change our keys to include feature flags? > Let's put this on the list of things to do after this draft for the next one. > John wants to push to a new RFC. Here are three open issues. Okay. Werner -- Werner Koch Omnis enim res, quae dando non deficit, dum habetur g10 Code GmbH et non datur, nondum habetur, quomodo habenda est. Privacy Solutions -- Augustinus
- Diffs for next draft Jon Callas
- Re: Diffs for next draft Werner Koch
- Re: Diffs for next draft Jon Callas
- Re: Diffs for next draft Edwin Woudt
- Re: Diffs for next draft Jon Callas
- Encoding of "features" subpacket Michael Young
- Re: Diffs for next draft Michael Young
- Re: Encoding of "features" subpacket Jon Callas
- Re: Diffs for next draft David Shaw
- Re: Diffs for next draft David Shaw
- Re: Diffs for next draft Jon Callas
- Klima/Rosa attack (was: Re: Diffs for next draft) Edwin Woudt
- Encoding "secret key is hashed" Michael Young
- Re: Klima/Rosa attack (was: Re: Diffs for next dr… Ingo Luetkebohle
- Re: Encoding "secret key is hashed" Edwin Woudt
- Re: Encoding "secret key is hashed" Werner Koch
- Re: Encoding "secret key is hashed" Michael Young
- Re: Encoding "secret key is hashed" Michael Young
- Re: Encoding "secret key is hashed" Ingo Luetkebohle
- Re: Encoding "secret key is hashed" Werner Koch
- Re: Encoding "secret key is hashed" Michael Young
- Re: Diffs for next draft Jon Callas
- Re: Diffs for next draft David Shaw
- Re: Diffs for next draft Werner Koch
- How to update a self-signature? Michael Young
- Re: How to update a self-signature? David Shaw
- Re: Diffs for next draft Florian Weimer
- Re: How to update a self-signature? Werner Koch
- Re: How to update a self-signature? Derek Atkins
- Re: How to update a self-signature? Florian Weimer
- Re: How to update a self-signature? David Shaw
- Re: How to update a self-signature? David Shaw
- Re: How to update a self-signature? Derek Atkins
- Re: How to update a self-signature? Werner Koch
- Re: How to update a self-signature? David Shaw
- Re: How to update a self-signature? Werner Koch
- Keyserver thoughts (was Re: How to update a self-… David Shaw
- Certification revocation -- identifying the revok… Michael Young
- Re: Certification revocation -- identifying the r… Thomas Roessler