Re: secure sign & encrypt
pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) Fri, 24 May 2002 05:05 UTC
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Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 16:58:06 +1200
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From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz
To: Terje.Braaten@concept.fr, dpkemp@missi.ncsc.mil
Subject: Re: secure sign & encrypt
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"David P. Kemp" <dpkemp@missi.ncsc.mil> writes: >Each layer does what it does - if you want the security services provided by >three layers (ESE), or what S/MIME calls triple-wrapping (SES), then you must >use three layers. The motivation for S/MIME triple wrap was AFAIK use by automated mail gateways. If you always have to sign the plaintext then it makes it impossible to create a mail gateway which only lets signed data in or out, because the gateway would have to hold all the private keys in order to verify the sigs. Thus the SES triple-wrap. I know Don Davis looked at the RFC which covered this (2633?) when he was writing his paper and found it didn't really solve the problem. Peter.
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- Re: secure sign & encrypt Peter Gutmann
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- Re: secure sign & encrypt Derek Atkins
- Re: secure sign & encrypt Derek Atkins
- RE: secure sign & encrypt Terje Braaten
- RE: secure sign & encrypt Terje Braaten
- Re: secure sign & encrypt David P. Kemp
- Re: secure sign & encrypt Derek Atkins
- Re: secure sign & encrypt Matthew Byng-Maddick
- RE: secure sign & encrypt Terje Braaten
- RE: secure sign & encrypt Dominikus Scherkl
- RE: secure sign & encrypt Dominikus Scherkl
- Re: secure sign & encrypt disastry
- RE: secure sign & encrypt Terje Braaten
- Re: secure sign & encrypt disastry
- Re: secure sign & encrypt Derek Atkins
- RE: secure sign & encrypt Terje Braaten
- Re: secure sign & encrypt Derek Atkins
- RE: secure sign & encrypt Terje Braaten
- RE: secure sign & encrypt Terje Braaten
- Re: secure sign & encrypt Derek Atkins
- Re: secure sign & encrypt Derek Atkins
- RE: secure sign & encrypt Terje Braaten
- RE: secure sign & encrypt Terje Braaten
- Re: secure sign & encrypt Peter Gutmann
- Re: secure sign & encrypt Michael Young
- Re: secure sign & encrypt Paul Hoffman / IMC
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- Re: secure sign & encrypt Brian M. Carlson
- Re: secure sign & encrypt Jon Callas
- Re: secure sign & encrypt Adrian 'Dagurashibanipal' von Bidder
- RE: secure sign & encrypt john.dlugosz
- RE: secure sign & encrypt Terje Braaten