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[perpass] RSA-OAEP

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Wed, 20 November 2013 15:50 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2013 10:49:56 -0500
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Subject: [perpass] RSA-OAEP
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We have known for a ver long time that PKCS #1 Version 1.5 (see RFC 2313) is vulnerable to adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks when applied for encryption purposes.  Exploitation reveals the result of a particular RSA decryption, requires access to an oracle which will respond to a hundreds of thousands of ciphertexts), which are constructed adaptively in response to previously-received replies providing information on the successes or failures of attempted decryption operations.  As a result, the attack appears significantly less feasible to perpetrate in store-and-forward environments than for interactive ones.

PKCS #1 Version 2.0 and Version 2.1 (see RFC 3447) include RSA-OAEP to address this situation, but we have seen very little movement toward RSA-OAEP.  While we are reviewing algorithm choices in light of the pervasive surveillance situation, I think we should take the time to address known vulnerabilities like this one.  If we don't, then we are leaving an partially open door for a well funded attacker.

Russ

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