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Re: [perpass] Howdy!

SM <sm@resistor.net> Sat, 14 September 2013 14:38 UTC

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Date: Sat, 14 Sep 2013 06:55:40 -0700
To: Dean Willis <dean.willis@softarmor.com>
From: SM <sm@resistor.net>
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Cc: perpass@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [perpass] Howdy!
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Hi Dean,
At 10:12 13-09-2013, Dean Willis wrote:
>So unless we have widespread review, from people likely to be in the 
>influence of multiple and conflicting actors, we really haven't had 
>a review. How widespread? I'm not exactly sure -- but it means more 
>than one review, from more than one company, from more than one 
>sector, and from more than one nation-state at a minimum. Trust is 
>really hard; our best substitute is a very widespread consensus.
>
>Arguably, the mode that we've operated in for many years has given 
>us a rather bad current situation. Perhaps we should reassess "good enough".

The IETF has been operating in "good enough" mode since a long 
time.  Some proposals do not get widespread review.  There are 
variations of RFC 6302 in the IETF RFCs.  When I raised a "privacy 
issue" some time back the only person who supported the argument was 
Stephen Farrell.  The amount of effort to raise a "privacy issue" is 
discouraging.

It's difficult to ensure review from more than one nation-state when 
the majority is from one nation-state.  It is not always clear what 
the company or sector ties are.

There is a report of a Tor exit node being compromised.  It's 
unlikely that the problem could have been avoided with better 
encryption.  The architectural aspect of the problem was mentioned in 2005.

Regards,
-sm

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