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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Client's initial destination CID is unauthenticated (#1486)

Mike Bishop <notifications@github.com> Mon, 09 July 2018 19:46 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Client's initial destination CID is unauthenticated (#1486)
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But the protection on the Initial packets doesn't have a shared key yet.  That means an on-path attacker could decrypt, modify bytes, and re-encrypt.  (It would need to do the transformation in the reverse direction as well, of course.)  The question here is whether we want to attempt to detect such tampering.

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