Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Targeted attacks in Security Considerations (#2635)

Jana Iyengar <notifications@github.com> Fri, 19 April 2019 20:17 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Targeted attacks in Security Considerations (#2635)
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janaiyengar commented on this pull request.

a few nits

> @@ -5382,6 +5382,14 @@ Negotiation packets do not contain any mechanism to prevent version downgrade
 attacks.  Future versions of QUIC that use Version Negotiation packets MUST
 define a mechanism that is robust against version downgrade attacks.
 
+## Targeted Attacks by Routing
+
+Deployments should limit the ability of an attacker to target a new connection
+to a particular instance.  This means that client-controlled fields, such as the

```suggestion
to a particular server instance.  This means that client-controlled fields, such as the
```

> @@ -5382,6 +5382,14 @@ Negotiation packets do not contain any mechanism to prevent version downgrade
 attacks.  Future versions of QUIC that use Version Negotiation packets MUST
 define a mechanism that is robust against version downgrade attacks.
 
+## Targeted Attacks by Routing
+
+Deployments should limit the ability of an attacker to target a new connection
+to a particular instance.  This means that client-controlled fields, such as the
+initial Destination Connection ID used on Initial and 0-RTT packets SHOULD NOT
+be used to make routing decisions.  Ideally, routing decisions are made

```suggestion
be used by themselves to make routing decisions.  Ideally, routing decisions are made
```

> @@ -5382,6 +5382,14 @@ Negotiation packets do not contain any mechanism to prevent version downgrade
 attacks.  Future versions of QUIC that use Version Negotiation packets MUST
 define a mechanism that is robust against version downgrade attacks.
 
+## Targeted Attacks by Routing
+
+Deployments should limit the ability of an attacker to target a new connection
+to a particular instance.  This means that client-controlled fields, such as the
+initial Destination Connection ID used on Initial and 0-RTT packets SHOULD NOT
+be used to make routing decisions.  Ideally, routing decisions are made
+independently of client-selected values; a Source Connection ID can be selected
+to route subsequent packets to the same server.

```suggestion
to route later packets to the same server.
```

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