Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] clarify the scope of a NEW_TOKEN token (#3156)

Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com> Mon, 28 October 2019 09:24 UTC

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Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2019 02:24:07 -0700
From: Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] clarify the scope of a NEW_TOKEN token (#3156)
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martinthomson commented on this pull request.



> @@ -1698,10 +1698,14 @@ encrypted form in the token.
 It is unlikely that the client port number is the same on two different
 connections; validating the port is therefore unlikely to be successful.
 
-If the client has a token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame on a previous connection
-to what it believes to be the same server, it SHOULD include that value in the
-Token field of its Initial packet.  Including a token might allow the server to
-validate the client address without an additional round trip.
+A token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame is applicable against the servers that the

```suggestion
A token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame is applicable to any server that the
```

> @@ -1698,10 +1698,14 @@ encrypted form in the token.
 It is unlikely that the client port number is the same on two different
 connections; validating the port is therefore unlikely to be successful.
 
-If the client has a token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame on a previous connection
-to what it believes to be the same server, it SHOULD include that value in the
-Token field of its Initial packet.  Including a token might allow the server to
-validate the client address without an additional round trip.
+A token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame is applicable against the servers that the
+connection is considered authoritative for (e.g., server names included in the
+certificate).  A client MUST only use a token that is applicable to the server

```suggestion
certificate).  A client SHOULD only use a token that is applicable to the server
```

We don't need to prevent a client from using a token from one server on a completely different one.  That won't *work*, but the server needs to protect itself against outdated tokens and attack, so they shouldn't outright reject the connection.

> @@ -1698,10 +1698,14 @@ encrypted form in the token.
 It is unlikely that the client port number is the same on two different
 connections; validating the port is therefore unlikely to be successful.
 
-If the client has a token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame on a previous connection
-to what it believes to be the same server, it SHOULD include that value in the
-Token field of its Initial packet.  Including a token might allow the server to
-validate the client address without an additional round trip.
+A token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame is applicable against the servers that the
+connection is considered authoritative for (e.g., server names included in the
+certificate).  A client MUST only use a token that is applicable to the server
+that the client is connecting to to.  If the client has a token received in a
+NEW_TOKEN frame that is applicable to a new connection attempt, it SHOULD

Rephrase:

A client SHOULD use an applicable and previously unused token when connecting to a server.  Including a token in an Initial packet could allow the server to validate the client address without an additional round trip.

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