IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] The QUIC-TLS draft should define anti-forgery limits for packet lengths up to 2^16 (#3701)

David Schinazi <notifications@github.com> Mon, 28 September 2020 22:25 UTC

Return-Path: <noreply@github.com>
X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 77A593A14CA for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 28 Sep 2020 15:25:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.208
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.208 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-1.2, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_16=1.092, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id yZkeb5GoFWNj for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 28 Sep 2020 15:25:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from out-17.smtp.github.com (out-17.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.200]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 462983A14B1 for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Mon, 28 Sep 2020 15:25:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from github-lowworker-943b171.ac4-iad.github.net (github-lowworker-943b171.ac4-iad.github.net [10.52.22.59]) by smtp.github.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 72A1C5C08F0 for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Mon, 28 Sep 2020 15:25:34 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1601331934; bh=jRbGC8Kpwgu4UzHw4XRS8g9+zBqxb8AYBPn8vWUxllU=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=bKkNGCBS45MuSi7oUX1Xl8VKUYo3qcbUs/o2K5fjM9AmZtGZ2EUCkqlpezQN8R0T9 r56rm+xKmHeeo9L05ijhDsZuiNZNqeonibWrF/iPfdy1a9pTfwfLrleS09J3fn841N 5CcH1Uy5yhZ+W9bjA5Bvh+SIes4rkJk47Pt/u43U=
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 15:25:34 -0700
From: David Schinazi <notifications@github.com>
Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts <reply+AFTOJK7GURGQCKIBDPOAXXN5PZB55EVBNHHCKRFAVA@reply.github.com>
To: quicwg/base-drafts <base-drafts@noreply.github.com>
Cc: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>
Message-ID: <quicwg/base-drafts/issues/3701/700316012@github.com>
In-Reply-To: <quicwg/base-drafts/issues/3701@github.com>
References: <quicwg/base-drafts/issues/3701@github.com>
Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] The QUIC-TLS draft should define anti-forgery limits for packet lengths up to 2^16 (#3701)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5f7262de6334c_4e9e19f0190b2"; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: list
X-GitHub-Sender: DavidSchinazi
X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues
X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed
X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All
X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic-issues/nKbO7ts9hef1ExtJiQ4AuBEPbqM>
X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG <quic-issues.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic-issues/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic-issues@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 22:25:45 -0000

If you're fairly confident in your analysis that 2^16 byte packets are safe given certain bounds, can we instead put those bounds in the spec? If you're not confident in said bounds, then I'm uncomfortable shipping a protocol whose security bounds we are not confident in. At the end of the day, either we know the bounds or we don't, I'm not understanding what a middle-ground looks like here.

-- 
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/3701#issuecomment-700316012

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email