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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] The QUIC-TLS draft should define anti-forgery limits for packet lengths up to 2^16 (#3701)

ekr <notifications@github.com> Tue, 29 September 2020 23:18 UTC

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Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 16:18:18 -0700
From: ekr <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] The QUIC-TLS draft should define anti-forgery limits for packet lengths up to 2^16 (#3701)
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I think I am with David here.

Specifically: I think the document should provide a traffic limit and an analysis that those limits provide security at least at a given level.  It seems like we have three choices (1) restrict the packet size (2) lower the traffic limits (3) provide an analysis with a weaker guarantee, given that as MT points out, the guarantee is somewhat arbitrary

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