Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 27 July 2017 15:48 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 08:47:57 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBO8X=er-J=yfk+5p1v-SNzP1RztCv4bWA0cg7OAOzqd-A@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE
To: Jana Iyengar <jri@google.com>
Cc: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>, "Swindells, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge, UK)" <thomas.swindells@nokia.com>, Ian Swett <ianswett@google.com>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
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On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 8:35 AM, Jana Iyengar <jri@google.com> wrote: > I'm also in favor of the RST model. Subodh -- to your point about > time_wait, this dovetails with a timeout we need to have in place for > regular connection close, where we must allow for retransmissions to be > sent and for responses to peer's retransmissions. (It's what I call > DRAIN_TIME). > > So basically, once a connection close is sent, the sender waits for > DRAIN_TIME and then discards state. The receivers sends an ack and > immediately discards state on receipt. > Jana, I'm finding myself a bit confused. Can you perhaps draw me a diagram of what you mean when you say "allow for retransmissions to be sent"...? -Ekr > As ekr notes, receipt of this ack could circumvent the DRAIN_TIME timeout. > TCP time wait accounts for network lifetime of packets, which we don't have > to handle, since once both sides are torn down, there's no danger of an old > connection interfering with a new one. That said, I'm still thinking about > if it's possible for an old packet circling the network to create > connection state when received after all state is torn down... If we want > to ensure that doesn't happen, we'd want to account for network lifetime (2 > msl). > > On Jul 27, 2017 7:59 AM, "Eric Rescorla" <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote: > >> I just filed a PR for this at: >> https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/705 >> >> It explicitly permits duplication. >> >> -Ekr >> >> >> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 7:51 AM, Ian Swett <ianswett@google.com> wrote: >> >>> I would recommend sending an identical packet every time, since there's >>> no value to encrypting a new one with a new packet number, but it increases >>> the amount of state you have to keep and the CPU to respond to spurious >>> packets. >>> >>> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 10:47 AM, Swindells, Thomas (Nokia - >>> GB/Cambridge, UK) <thomas.swindells@nokia.com> wrote: >>> >>>> > > However, this isn't that big a deal, because as >>>> > > noted above, you can throw away the connection and just send a >>>> stored >>>> > > packet, or alternately, just send public reset (or just go silent). >>>> Should/would you have to generate a newly encrypted packet with a new >>>> packet number each time (as per other retransmissions)? >>>> Or is this a special case because it is the final packet and so doesn't >>>> matter if it is duplicated? >>>> >>>> >>> >>
- Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Eric Rescorla
- Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Ian Swett
- Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Christian Huitema
- Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Subodh Iyengar
- Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Eric Rescorla
- Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Willy Tarreau
- RE: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Swindells, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge, UK)
- Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Ian Swett
- Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Eric Rescorla
- Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Jana Iyengar
- Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Eric Rescorla
- Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Patrick McManus
- Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Christian Huitema
- Re: Closing on CONNECTION_CLOSE Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen