Re: [radext] WGLC for draft-ietf-radext-tls-psk-04

Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com> Tue, 16 January 2024 15:38 UTC

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From: Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com>
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Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 10:37:36 -0500
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To: Fabian Mauchle <fabian.mauchle@switch.ch>
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Subject: Re: [radext] WGLC for draft-ietf-radext-tls-psk-04
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  I believe that the latest draft addresses all open concerns about the content.

  The only remaining issue is the document status.  It's currently informational.  It perhaps could better be "experimental", to show that it is on the standards track.

  Jan-Frederiks point is that we could perhaps just make it proposed standard.

  I think there are benefits to that.  However, changing the status is likely to require the agreement of the WG and the AD.

  Comments?

> On Jan 15, 2024, at 6:20 AM, Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com> wrote:
> 
> On Jan 15, 2024, at 5:41 AM, Fabian Mauchle <fabian.mauchle@switch.ch> wrote:
>> TLS1.3 session resumption requires it to be an opaque blob - externally provided PSK does not imply this, we can be more restrictive - if we want to.
> 
>  I believe it's useful to suggest that PSKs managed by administrators be understandable by those administrators.  i.e. UTF-8 text is much easier for people to manage than opaque blobs.
> 
>> E.G. RFC4279 requires that the identity MUST be UTF-8. Currently we require that the client supports this (but we don't forbid other things).
>> But we could also be more restrictive and define that client and server MUST implement RFC4279 for the externally provided PSK. Thus the server may only accept non-UTF-8 for session resumption. This might simplify server implementations to distinguish between PSK and resumption.
> 
>  I believe so, yes.
> 
>  Alan DeKok.
> 
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