Re: [radext] Proposed charter text based on IETF-115 BoF

Peter Deacon <peterd@iea-software.com> Tue, 22 November 2022 16:56 UTC

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Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 08:56:33 -0800
From: Peter Deacon <peterd@iea-software.com>
To: Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com>
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Subject: Re: [radext] Proposed charter text based on IETF-115 BoF
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On Tue, 22 Nov 2022, Alan DeKok wrote:

> On Nov 22, 2022, at 9:49 AM, Peter Deacon <peterd@iea-software.com> wrote:
>> What I'm not clear on is where in any applicable security standards are such algorithms prohibited in applications for reasons other than security?

>  NIS SP 800-140Cr1 lists the allowed digest algorithms in FIPS-140-3: 
> https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140Cr1.pdf. 
> MD5 isn't on the list

>  i.e. they list the allowed ciphers, digests, etc.  Everything else is
>  explicitly forbidden. So you can't use MD5 for *any* purpose and be
>  FIPS compliant.

Is anyone aware of a specific reference to specific text of either FIPS or 
similar standards that say MD5 can't be used for any purpose?

Here is an implementation guide for FIPS 140-2 that is the closest 
thing I've ever been able to find that speaks to this specific issue.

https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips140-2/fips1402ig.pdf

pg95 "non-approved cryptographic algorithms may be used in the approved 
mode of operation if the non-approved algorithms are not a security 
function. "

Starting pg95 "Possible example scenarios of non-approved cryptographic 
algorithms in various modes of operation"

...

2. "Use of an approved, non-approved or proprietary algorithm for a 
purpose that is not security relevant or is redundant to an approved 
cryptographic algorithm"

It seems to me given the list examples of non-approved algorithms for 
non-security that SRADIUS is not necessary to comply with FIPS 
requirements.  With regards to RADIUS over TLS MD5 use is "redundant" and 
security is provided by an approved cryptographic algorithm.

regards,
Peter