Re: [Rift] RIFT fingerprint coverage
Bruno Rijsman <brunorijsman@gmail.com> Sun, 21 July 2019 10:40 UTC
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From: Bruno Rijsman <brunorijsman@gmail.com>
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Date: Sun, 21 Jul 2019 12:39:55 +0200
Cc: rift@ietf.org
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To: Tony Przygienda <tonysietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Rift] RIFT fingerprint coverage
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Fixing one important mistake in bold red below: > On Jul 21, 2019, at 11:35 AM, Bruno Rijsman <brunorijsman@gmail.com> wrote: > > Hi Tony and others, > > I just noticed that the RIFT fingerprints do not cover the key-id nor the fingerprint-length nor the major-version. > > This means that if an adversary changes the key-id, fingerprint-length, or major-version, it will not be detected by the fingerprint. > > I cannot think of an immediate attack vector (maybe force a weaker algorithm by changing the key-id), but "it feels wrong". > > I wonder whether we should expand the coverage of fingerprints slightly, as shown below? > > Note that AFAIK in OSPF (for example) the digest does cover the key-id and auth-data-len. > > Suggested change: > > 0 1 2 3 > 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 > > UDP Header: > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > | Source Port | RIFT destination port | > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > | UDP Length | UDP Checksum | > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > > Outer Security Envelope Header: > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > | RIFT MAGIC | Packet Number | > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > | Reserved | RIFT Major | Outer Key ID | Outer | > | | Version | | Fingerprint | > | | | | Length | > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > | | > ~ Outer Security Fingerprint covers all content starting ~ > | at the Reserved field in the Outer Security Envelope Header | > | but excluding this fingerprint | > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > | Weak Nonce Local | Weak Nonce Remote | > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > | Remaining TIE Lifetime (all 1s in case of LIE) | > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > > TIE Origin Security Envelope Header: > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > | | TIE Origin | > | TIE Origin Key ID | Fingerprint | > | | Length | > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > | | > ~ TIE Origin Security Fingerprint covers all content starting ~ > | at the TIE Origin Key ID field but excluding this fingerprint| > | | > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > > Serialized RIFT Model Object > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > | | > ~ Serialized RIFT Model Object ~ > | | > +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ > > PS 1: I know that the rift-magic and packet-nr fields are left out of the fingerprint coverege on purpose, so I left it that way. > > PS 2: I also updated the names have a clearer distinction between the two fingerprints. > > — Bruno
- [Rift] RIFT fingerprint coverage Bruno Rijsman
- Re: [Rift] RIFT fingerprint coverage Bruno Rijsman
- Re: [Rift] RIFT fingerprint coverage Antoni Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] RIFT fingerprint coverage Bruno Rijsman
- Re: [Rift] RIFT fingerprint coverage Bruno Rijsman
- Re: [Rift] RIFT fingerprint coverage Bruno Rijsman
- Re: [Rift] RIFT fingerprint coverage Antoni Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] RIFT fingerprint coverage Tony Przygienda