RE: Request for WG adoption of draft-mahesh-bfd-authentication

[Gregory Mirsky <[e-mail]>]

Hi Dacheng,
HW became more capable and we, one hopes, wiser. Perhaps it's time to re-visit our options.

	Regards,
		Greg

-----Original Message-----
From: Dacheng Zhang [mailto:[e-mail]] 
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 11:12 PM
To: Gregory Mirsky; Marc Binderberger; Reshad Rahman (rrahman); [e-mail]; Stephen Farrell
Cc: [e-mail]
Subject: Re: Request for WG adoption of draft-mahesh-bfd-authentication



在 15-11-24 下午2:46， "Gregory Mirsky" <[e-mail]> 写入:

>Dear All,
>I'd like to share comment by Security AD Stephen Farrell on a work that 
>is directly related to BFD, draft-ietf-mpls-lsp-ping-mpls-tp-oam-conf
>(hope it is OK to raise security awareness in BFD community):
>
>> - 2.1.1, is there any chance of moving on from the "Keyed SHA1"
>> 
>> from RFC5880 to e.g. HMAC-SHA256 for this? We're generally trying to 
>> get that kind of transition done as we can and moving to use of a 
>> standard integrity check rather than a more home-grown one has some 
>> benefits. The HMAC-SHA1-like thing you're doing is still probably ok, 
>> (though could maybe do with crypto eyeballs on it as there may have 
>> been relevant new results since 2010) but future-proofing would 
>> suggest moving to HMAC-SHA256 if we can. (I can imagine such a change 
>> might require a new document, but am asking anyway:-)
>> 
>> GIM>> The fact is that we're bound by what is defined in RFC 5880.
>
>I wonder for how long though, that's now a five year old RFC.
>Assuming it takes a few years for new deployments to pick up new 
>algorithms, isn't it time that a whole bunch of algorithm choices were 
>revisited?
>
>> There was a proposal to strengthen BFD security BFD Generic  
>>Cryptographic
>>Authentication<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth
>>-03
>>> but the document had expired.
>
>Pity that.

I am one of the co-author of that draft. We didn’t try to update document because we got the feedback from the group that the influence on the performance is a big concern. That is why I raised the question in the last email whether it is a good time for us to re-consider the usage of
aha-2 in BFD.
>