Re: Request for WG adoption of draft-mahesh-bfd-authentication

["Dacheng Zhang" <[e-mail]>]

Hi, Loa:

Thank you for the comments. No problem. Actually, there are two drafts for
strengthening BFD security:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth-06, which
specify a generic authentication mechanism for BFD.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-bfd-hmac-sha-05, which discusses
how to support SHA2 based on the generic authentication extension.

The first draft has been adopted as a WG draft. So, it would be great for
the group to review it again and let us know if you have any comments.

Cheers

Dacheng


在 15-11-25 下午3:22， "Loa Andersson" <[e-mail]> 写入:

>Dacheng,
>
>Maybe do it the IETF way - discuss on the mailing list how it should
>be updated, when we have consesnsus - update draft, and then see if
>there is anything that we need to take up time to do at the f2f
>meeting :) !
>
>/Loa
>
>On 2015-11-25 13:57, Dacheng Zhang wrote:
>> Great! Let us update that draft and discuss it in the next IETF meeting.
>> ^_^
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Dacheng
>>
>> 在 15-11-25 上午9:33， "Gregory Mirsky" <[e-mail]> 写入:
>>
>>> Hi Dacheng,
>>> HW became more capable and we, one hopes, wiser. Perhaps it's time to
>>> re-visit our options.
>>>
>>> 	Regards,
>>> 		Greg
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Dacheng Zhang [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>> Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 11:12 PM
>>> To: Gregory Mirsky; Marc Binderberger; Reshad Rahman (rrahman);
>>> [e-mail]; Stephen Farrell
>>> Cc: [e-mail]
>>> Subject: Re: Request for WG adoption of draft-mahesh-bfd-authentication
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 在 15-11-24 下午2:46， "Gregory Mirsky" <[e-mail]> 写入:
>>>
>>>> Dear All,
>>>> I'd like to share comment by Security AD Stephen Farrell on a work
>>>>that
>>>> is directly related to BFD, draft-ietf-mpls-lsp-ping-mpls-tp-oam-conf
>>>> (hope it is OK to raise security awareness in BFD community):
>>>>
>>>>> - 2.1.1, is there any chance of moving on from the "Keyed SHA1"
>>>>>
>>>>> from RFC5880 to e.g. HMAC-SHA256 for this? We're generally trying to
>>>>> get that kind of transition done as we can and moving to use of a
>>>>> standard integrity check rather than a more home-grown one has some
>>>>> benefits. The HMAC-SHA1-like thing you're doing is still probably ok,
>>>>> (though could maybe do with crypto eyeballs on it as there may have
>>>>> been relevant new results since 2010) but future-proofing would
>>>>> suggest moving to HMAC-SHA256 if we can. (I can imagine such a change
>>>>> might require a new document, but am asking anyway:-)
>>>>>
>>>>> GIM>> The fact is that we're bound by what is defined in RFC 5880.
>>>>
>>>> I wonder for how long though, that's now a five year old RFC.
>>>> Assuming it takes a few years for new deployments to pick up new
>>>> algorithms, isn't it time that a whole bunch of algorithm choices were
>>>> revisited?
>>>>
>>>>> There was a proposal to strengthen BFD security BFD Generic
>>>>> Cryptographic
>>>>> 
>>>>>Authentication<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bhatia-bfd-crypto-auth
>>>>> -03
>>>>>> but the document had expired.
>>>>
>>>> Pity that.
>>>
>>> I am one of the co-author of that draft. We didn’t try to update
>>>document
>>> because we got the feedback from the group that the influence on the
>>> performance is a big concern. That is why I raised the question in the
>>> last email whether it is a good time for us to re-consider the usage of
>>> aha-2 in BFD.
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>