Re: [saag] Additions to RFC 3631?

Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG> Mon, 21 May 2012 09:52 UTC

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Date: Mon, 21 May 2012 05:52:41 -0400
From: Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG>
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Subject: Re: [saag] Additions to RFC 3631?
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>> If the point of a mandatory-to-implement mechanism is
>> interoperability, allowing it to be disabled is a bad idea; it has
>> pretty much the same effect on interoperability as not having it
>> there in the first place: peers cannot count on its availability
>> when speaking with peers they have no particular knowledge of.
> How would you propose to handle the situation where an MTI algorithm
> is found to be vulnerable?

Disable it.

That is to say, I would scrap the mandatory-to-implement part, not the
allow-disabling part.  Besides, after technology has marched on for
five - or ten, or twenty - years, today's best is likely to look
utterly ludicrous.  Time was, crypt(1) - a one-rotor Enigma machine,
basically - actually provided a useful level of security.  Today, it's
what Schneier calls `kid sister' crypto, at best.  Mandatory-to-offer
algorithms lead to forcing people to choose between ignoring the spec
and running grossly insecure algorithms, while allowing disabling of
mandatory-to-implement algorithms breaks most of the point of
mandatory-to-implement.

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