IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [saag] Additions to RFC 3631?

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Mon, 21 May 2012 17:23 UTC

Return-Path: <nico@cryptonector.com>
X-Original-To: saag@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: saag@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 101FD21F85E4 for <saag@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 21 May 2012 10:23:10 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.977
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.977 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4KRVfgRNaPFA for <saag@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 21 May 2012 10:23:09 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from homiemail-a66.g.dreamhost.com (caiajhbdcbef.dreamhost.com [208.97.132.145]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7AE4B21F85C7 for <saag@ietf.org>; Mon, 21 May 2012 10:23:09 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from homiemail-a66.g.dreamhost.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by homiemail-a66.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3F4AE350072 for <saag@ietf.org>; Mon, 21 May 2012 10:23:09 -0700 (PDT)
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=cryptonector.com; h=mime-version :in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to:cc: content-type; q=dns; s=cryptonector.com; b=E9vxnfTUqqSVdvZ/EiKOo MoshYPTYkOQfYkBpMz7NkmV3RgEyC44KJ0FfrJusIwJo5WjAGAFCU9wG2SctAW5g 0lC7YgkZA44k3Js9A0h47V8hTKGp0ptDXz71PM2VoFI0BAdcPGO1cn99gITIZ3B1 6Xs2zH7sMV5fstJePE0LmA=
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=cryptonector.com; h= mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from :to:cc:content-type; s=cryptonector.com; bh=hmaAGVP7tQaCLMETokJB PnAIEzE=; b=NTA+pd425ltf29uLRmSS2VxSkGm5fPxvAhsm7pqvOKlOsvLe/P9Y drqnZm1yz/lzC4KHexXWYm6EVFD+aOrM3nbUaupWShd62qY0k2RGYjayam33/CPx tTG2Vfb1awfW81v//+3+OCcbRfB3bFR/AOCeAsFqUAYz+ceMat1L/Rw=
Received: from mail-pb0-f44.google.com (mail-pb0-f44.google.com [209.85.160.44]) (using TLSv1 with cipher RC4-MD5 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: nico@cryptonector.com) by homiemail-a66.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 25E43350058 for <saag@ietf.org>; Mon, 21 May 2012 10:23:09 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by pbcwy7 with SMTP id wy7so7365331pbc.31 for <saag@ietf.org>; Mon, 21 May 2012 10:23:08 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.68.204.2 with SMTP id ku2mr70502064pbc.55.1337620988806; Mon, 21 May 2012 10:23:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.68.5.99 with HTTP; Mon, 21 May 2012 10:23:08 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <201205190331.XAA28531@Sparkle.Rodents-Montreal.ORG>
References: <300A2E9F-E99B-46FA-A101-E3611BD0D197@cs.columbia.edu> <201205190331.XAA28531@Sparkle.Rodents-Montreal.ORG>
Date: Mon, 21 May 2012 12:23:08 -0500
Message-ID: <CAK3OfOjZT_9J6r023nTv7X0-L2v2Wp88U72nOepmaRwx436dGg@mail.gmail.com>
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Mouse <mouse@rodents-montreal.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Cc: saag@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [saag] Additions to RFC 3631?
X-BeenThere: saag@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Area Advisory Group <saag.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/saag>, <mailto:saag-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/saag>
List-Post: <mailto:saag@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:saag-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag>, <mailto:saag-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 21 May 2012 17:23:13 -0000

On Fri, May 18, 2012 at 10:31 PM, Mouse <mouse@rodents-montreal.org> wrote:
> If the point of a mandatory-to-implement mechanism is interoperability,
> allowing it to be disabled is a bad idea; it has pretty much the same
> effect on interoperability as not having it there in the first place:
> peers cannot count on its availability when speaking with peers they
> have no particular knowledge of.

Mileage varies.  You're happy with some passwords-in-the-clear use
cases but you're not fine with MTI algorithms in case they become too
weak -- not quite a contradiciton in terms, but still strange.

IMO we need several MTI algorithms, not just one and certainly not just zero.

Nico
--

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email