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Re: [saag] On PKI vs. Pinning (SAAG 108 preview)

Ben Laurie <ben@links.org> Tue, 28 July 2020 19:56 UTC

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From: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 20:56:33 +0100
Message-ID: <CAG5KPzx0RsYmS8E78Giz5we6bgOmwMvTUH6q_Qk-2gfSVFsLGg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Cc: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, IETF Security Area Advisory Group <saag@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [saag] On PKI vs. Pinning (SAAG 108 preview)
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I'm a little surprised by this conversation. Why would SAAG want to support
a practice that flies in the face of everything we know about key
management?

On Tue, 28 Jul 2020 at 20:49, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
>
> On 28/07/2020 20:42, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > Sorry for the clumsy description.  Basically, if you squint hard, you
> could
> > claim that at least some types of pinning are actually a PKI, just a
> > degenerate PKI.
>
> Ah gotcha.
>
> ISTM more useful to treat pinning as an adjunct to whatever
> PKI is used by the application that can be MITM'd and not
> bother with pinning as a potential replacement for that
> PKI. There's nothing wrong with an application being based
> on it's very-own PKI of course, but seems less useful for
> the IETF to try describe pinning for custom protocols where
> we don't know the details.
>
> Cheers,
> S.
> _______________________________________________
> saag mailing list
> saag@ietf.org
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