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Re: [saag] Ubiquitous Encryption: spam filtering

Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> Tue, 30 June 2015 06:46 UTC

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Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2015 08:46:00 +0200
From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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To: joel jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, John Levine <johnl@taugh.com>
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Subject: Re: [saag] Ubiquitous Encryption: spam filtering
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Hi,

On 6/30/15 8:27 AM, joel jaeggli wrote:

>>
>> Main constraint is that you don't want to accept end-to-end encrypted
>> email unless it is signed by someone you know. So the endy mail problem
>> becomes an introduction problem. 
> The fact that parties that are known to each other have not in general
> been mutually authenticated is a, if not the, significant conduit of
> phishing.
>
>

That is A component but not THE component.  When someone gets hacked,
the bad guy usually has access to sufficient bonafides to get something
through the MSA.  To avoid this we would have to go to OOB
authentication systems, and that just ain't happening.

Eliot

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