Re: [saag] Ubiquitous Encryption: spam filtering

[Dave Crocker <[e-mail]>]

On 6/29/2015 11:27 PM, joel jaeggli wrote:
> On 6/29/15 8:13 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>> Main constraint is that you don't want to accept end-to-end encrypted
>> email unless it is signed by someone you know. So the endy mail problem
>> becomes an introduction problem. 
> 
> The fact that parties that are known to each other have not in general
> been mutually authenticated is a, if not the, significant conduit of
> phishing.


There is a very strong tendency to try to characterize one or another
underlying aspect of human communication as simple, and therefore to
believe that imposing adequate quality control on its conduct is
relatively straightforward.

As an example, new contacts from individuals with whom one has had no
previous contact, constitute an essential component of human
communication.  The constraint stated at the top of this message would
eliminate that capability.

(Another problem with the constraint is that, as noted, it ignores
various other abuse vectors that are based on exploiting those we
already know.)


For every line of anti-abuse pursuit or proposed mechanism for
controlling it, one should always begin by asking how badly it is
Procrustean and whether chopping or stretching online communications
that little bit more really is tolerable.  When the answer is yes,
consider carefully who is making the assessment and what gives them the
right to add that (global) restriction...

d/
-- 
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net