Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials

Dick Brooks <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com> Wed, 10 August 2022 19:06 UTC

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Reply-To: dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com
From: Dick Brooks <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com>
To: 'Steve Lasker' <Steve.Lasker@microsoft.com>, "'Hart, Charlie'" <charlie.hart@hal.hitachi.com>, 'Orie Steele' <orie@transmute.industries>
Cc: 'Steve Lasker' <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, scitt@ietf.org
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Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2022 15:06:10 -0400
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Subject: Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials
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Steve, et al,

 

Some industries have a specific set of CA's they have vetted and approved
for use, i.e.,  energy industry transactions. 

 

I don't think a single root of trust can be implemented, practically across
all industries, if my energy industry experience is any indicator.

 

Thanks,

 

Dick Brooks

  

Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, 

Sector Coordinating Council - A Public-Private Partnership

 

 <https://reliableenergyanalytics.com/products> Never trust software, always
verify and report! T

 <http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com/>
http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com

Email:  <mailto:dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com>
dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com

Tel: +1 978-696-1788

 

From: Steve Lasker <Steve.Lasker@microsoft.com> 
Sent: Wednesday, August 10, 2022 2:22 PM
To: dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com; 'Hart, Charlie'
<charlie.hart@hal.hitachi.com>; Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries>
Cc: 'Steve Lasker' <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>;
scitt@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable
Credentials

 

It's an interesting example of whether a single root trust store is the best
solution. 

Just because the browser trusts a root certificate, doesn't mean it's
something we individually, or as a company believe is appropriate. We'll
just leave the specifics for obvious conclusion. 

This just points to the value of having personal, company, industry policy
based trust stores

 

From: SCITT <scitt-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:scitt-bounces@ietf.org> > On
Behalf Of Dick Brooks
Sent: Wednesday, August 3, 2022 11:26 AM
To: 'Hart, Charlie' <charlie.hart@hal.hitachi.com
<mailto:charlie.hart@hal.hitachi.com> >; Orie Steele
<orie@transmute.industries <mailto:orie@transmute.industries> >
Cc: 'Steve Lasker' <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org
<mailto:Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> >; scitt@ietf.org
<mailto:scitt@ietf.org> 
Subject: Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable
Credentials

 

That's correct, Charlie. OATI's root cert is not included in the browser
trusted certificate store. 

 

I'm not sure why they chose to do this. 

 

Thanks,

 

Dick Brooks

  

Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, 

Sector Coordinating Council - A Public-Private Partnership

 

 
<https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freliablee
nergyanalytics.com%2Fproducts&data=05%7C01%7CSteve.Lasker%40microsoft.com%7C
d8d28e6d530b4f586a9b08da757d9685%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%
7C637951480535074276%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2l
uMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=KsnfIaGAkqxuCxU3BK
AdgZqmbrtafNTMzZMb0caF4Wg%3D&reserved=0> Never trust software, always verify
and report! T

 
<https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.reliab
leenergyanalytics.com%2F&data=05%7C01%7CSteve.Lasker%40microsoft.com%7Cd8d28
e6d530b4f586a9b08da757d9685%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637
951480535074276%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIi
LCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=TBONEGxZB1mG%2FnXafj9Gj
DqeB47Pb5W0eQ6l6uTL2Wg%3D&reserved=0> http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com

Email:  <mailto:dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com>
dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com

Tel: +1 978-696-1788

 

From: Hart, Charlie <charlie.hart@hal.hitachi.com
<mailto:charlie.hart@hal.hitachi.com> > 
Sent: Wednesday, August 3, 2022 12:00 PM
To: 'Orie Steele' <orie@transmute.industries
<mailto:orie@transmute.industries> >; dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com
<mailto:dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com> 
Cc: 'Steve Lasker' <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org
<mailto:Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> >; scitt@ietf.org
<mailto:scitt@ietf.org> 
Subject: Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable
Credentials

 

(Side comment: I see that OATI is not a recognized root certificate
authority by Mozilla or Apple - didn't check others - so the website is
therefore inaccessible without relaxing security.)

 

  _____  

From: SCITT <scitt-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:scitt-bounces@ietf.org> > on
behalf of Hart, Charlie <charlie.hart@hal.hitachi.com
<mailto:charlie.hart@hal.hitachi.com> >
Sent: Wednesday, August 3, 2022 11:48 AM
To: 'Orie Steele' <orie@transmute.industries
<mailto:orie@transmute.industries> >; dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com
<mailto:dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com>  <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com
<mailto:dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com> >
Cc: 'Steve Lasker' <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org
<mailto:Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> >; scitt@ietf.org
<mailto:scitt@ietf.org>  <scitt@ietf.org <mailto:scitt@ietf.org> >
Subject: Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable
Credentials 

 

Thanks Dick. That is really helpful for SCITT a lot of related projects I am
working on.

 

Charlie

  _____  

From: SCITT <scitt-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:scitt-bounces@ietf.org> > on
behalf of Dick Brooks <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com
<mailto:dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com> >
Sent: Wednesday, August 3, 2022 9:26 AM
To: 'Orie Steele' <orie@transmute.industries
<mailto:orie@transmute.industries> >
Cc: 'Steve Lasker' <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org
<mailto:Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> >; scitt@ietf.org
<mailto:scitt@ietf.org>  <scitt@ietf.org <mailto:scitt@ietf.org> >
Subject: [EXT]Re: [SCITT] Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials 

 

Orie,

 

Here is a high-level overview of the authentication mechanism and tracking
used today for OASIS, inter-tie electricity scheduling.

 

Everything starts with the NAESB registry (EIR);
https://www.naesb.org/pdf4/webregistry_mo_registration_quick_ref_guide_v1.0_
0417.pdf 

 

Entities involved in inter-tie electricity transactions must register with
NAESB's EIR, see link above.

The registration process requires a party to obtain a NAESB compliant X.509
certificate from an accredited certificate authority (ACA);
https://www.naesb.org/pdf4/ac_authorities_2022.pdf

 

Entities use their digital certificates for identification in OASIS;
https://www.naesbwry.oati.com/NAESBWRY/sys-index.wml 

 

Inter-tie transactions are scheduled and tracked, using an E-TAG;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NERC_Tag 

 

E-TAG's are used to "connect the dots" and settle transactions that flow
across Balancing Authroities.

 

Hope this helps.

 

Thanks,

 

Dick Brooks

  

Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, 

Sector Coordinating Council - A Public-Private Partnership

 

Never trust software, always verify and report! T

http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com

Email:  <mailto:dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com>
dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com

Tel: +1 978-696-1788

 

From: Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries
<mailto:orie@transmute.industries> > 
Sent: Wednesday, August 3, 2022 9:09 AM
To: dick <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com
<mailto:dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com> >
Cc: Steve Lasker <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org
<mailto:Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> >; scitt@ietf.org
<mailto:scitt@ietf.org> 
Subject: Re: [SCITT] Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials

 

Thanks! 

 

I am interested in applying Verifiable Credentials to energy use cases, even
if we don't have customers in that sector today.

The calls are open (https://github.com/w3c-ccg/traceability-vocab#meetings),
but fair warning that most of the work happens on github async, and we
usually just process issues and PRs during call time.

There are also aspects of Verifiable Credentials that I believe are relevant
to the structure of endorsements / receipts:

The concept of "evidence":

- https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/#evidence
-
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-countersign#section-3.
1
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4998

 

As one example.

I am hopeful that the next version of the Verifiable Credentials
specification can point more directly to IETF RFCs to make its arguments, 
even if the json data model can't be updated to support CBOR / COSE as a
first class citizen this round.
Perhaps the next charter for that WG might support this better, if we pave
the way with examples.

Regards,

OS

 

On Wed, Aug 3, 2022, 7:54 AM Dick Brooks <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com
<mailto:dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com> > wrote:

I agree. This paper by Orie, Michael, Brian and Mahmoud is very useful as
guide for terminology and semantics.

 

I can provide the authors with a description of how we track electricity
transactions for inter-tie scheduling, called OASIS a NAESB standard, if
interested.

 

Thanks,

 

Dick Brooks

  

Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, 

Sector Coordinating Council - A Public-Private Partnership

 

Never trust software, always verify and report! T

http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com

Email:  <mailto:dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com>
dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com

Tel: +1 978-696-1788

 

From: SCITT <scitt-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:scitt-bounces@ietf.org> > On
Behalf Of Steve Lasker
Sent: Tuesday, August 2, 2022 8:21 PM
To: Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries
<mailto:orie@transmute.industries> >; scitt@ietf.org <mailto:scitt@ietf.org>

Subject: Re: [SCITT] Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials

 

Very cool, Orie. 

Love the sandbox experiments

 

 

From: SCITT <scitt-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:scitt-bounces@ietf.org> > On
Behalf Of Orie Steele
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2022 2:08 PM
To: scitt@ietf.org <mailto:scitt@ietf.org> 
Subject: [SCITT] Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials

 

I made this today:

https://github.com/OR13/endor

As it says in the readme, this is just a toy example I made up to experiment
with.

The nice thing about endorsing W3C Verifiable Credentials is that they are
already an abstraction that applies to "non software supply chain" use
cases... 

For example, we model cyber physical supply chain flows using them:

https://w3id.org/eability

There are a number of organizations looking at oil and gas, steel,
ecommerce, and agriculture supply chains.

Often they will share some common trade documents such as Bills of Lading or
Commercial Invoices.

These are examples of "SCITT Artifact Types" which you might expect to see
across various distinct supply chain use cases.

However, as is the case with Oil and Gas needing to account for fluid
dynamics, and software needing to account for compilers, build servers and
various source files, there are cases where you may need to model components
of a supply chain with Verifiable Credentials that are highly specific to
the use case.

If you can tolerate modeling in RDF, W3C Verifiable Credentials come with a
built in abstract data model that integrates well with existing industry
ontologies such as:

- https://www.ebi.ac.uk/chebi/
- https://qudt.org/

My main complaint against W3C Verifiable Credentials is the limitation to
JSON representations, if we could represent RDF in CBOR, we would have the
best of both worlds with the main remaining disadvantage being the namespace
overhead inherent in RDF.

If you drop that, you will likely need some registry or algorithm process
for handling collisions and interoperability, but there are various
solutions to those problems.

If you feel I butchered any of the concepts or terminology, feel free to
yell at me here or on github issues, as I said, I made this today, it's not
reflective of actual SCITT architecture, it was just to explore the space.

Regards,

OS



 

-- 

ORIE STEELE

Chief Technical Officer

www.transmute.industries