Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials
Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com> Thu, 11 August 2022 11:22 UTC
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Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 07:22:06 -0400
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries>, Steve Lasker <Steve.Lasker@microsoft.com>
CC: "scitt@ietf.org" <scitt@ietf.org>, Steve Lasker <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com" <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com>
Message-ID: <1B9FF775-B7AF-41F6-B8BE-A6783B0C5452@redhoundsoftware.com>
Thread-Topic: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials
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Subject: Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials
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A single “trust store” may or may not suffice, but we likely want to put some fences around each trust anchor to limit what the trust anchor may be used to verify. The FIDO metadata alliance has method of organizing trust anchors based on authenticator type: https://fidoalliance.org/specs/mds/fido-metadata-statement-v3.0-ps-20210518.html. I briefed this new spec to the RATS working group last month: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wallace-rats-concise-ta-stores-00. There’s a fork of the Veraison project’s Corim repo with support for the -00 draft added here: https://github.com/carl-wallace/corim. I’d imagine the environment and constraints parts move a bit still, but the rough idea may be what you are getting at below. From: SCITT <scitt-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries> Date: Wednesday, August 10, 2022 at 2:30 PM To: Steve Lasker <Steve.Lasker@microsoft.com> Cc: "scitt@ietf.org" <scitt@ietf.org>, Steve Lasker <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com" <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com> Subject: Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials > This just points to the value of having personal, company, industry policy based trust stores +1 to this, here are a few examples of how groups have formed their own trust systems: - https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-12-16-01/ (aviation / travel) - https://vci.org/issuers (healthcare) - https://support.apple.com/guide/keychain-access/what-is-keychain-access-kyca1083/mac (personal) You can imagine scenarios where a more limited set of issuers might be required, or cases where you really want to be very open. Regards, OS On Wed, Aug 10, 2022 at 1:21 PM Steve Lasker <Steve.Lasker@microsoft.com> wrote: It’s an interesting example of whether a single root trust store is the best solution. Just because the browser trusts a root certificate, doesn’t mean it’s something we individually, or as a company believe is appropriate. We’ll just leave the specifics for obvious conclusion. This just points to the value of having personal, company, industry policy based trust stores From: SCITT <scitt-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Dick Brooks Sent: Wednesday, August 3, 2022 11:26 AM To: 'Hart, Charlie' <charlie.hart@hal.hitachi.com>; Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries> Cc: 'Steve Lasker' <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>; scitt@ietf.org Subject: Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials That’s correct, Charlie. OATI’s root cert is not included in the browser trusted certificate store. I’m not sure why they chose to do this. Thanks, Dick Brooks Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, Sector Coordinating Council – A Public-Private Partnership Never trust software, always verify and report! ™ http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com Email: dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com Tel: +1 978-696-1788 From: Hart, Charlie <charlie.hart@hal.hitachi.com> Sent: Wednesday, August 3, 2022 12:00 PM To: 'Orie Steele' <orie@transmute.industries>; dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com Cc: 'Steve Lasker' <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>; scitt@ietf.org Subject: Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials (Side comment: I see that OATI is not a recognized root certificate authority by Mozilla or Apple - didn't check others - so the website is therefore inaccessible without relaxing security.) From: SCITT <scitt-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Hart, Charlie <charlie.hart@hal.hitachi.com> Sent: Wednesday, August 3, 2022 11:48 AM To: 'Orie Steele' <orie@transmute.industries>; dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com> Cc: 'Steve Lasker' <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>; scitt@ietf.org <scitt@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials Thanks Dick. That is really helpful for SCITT a lot of related projects I am working on. Charlie From: SCITT <scitt-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Dick Brooks <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com> Sent: Wednesday, August 3, 2022 9:26 AM To: 'Orie Steele' <orie@transmute.industries> Cc: 'Steve Lasker' <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>; scitt@ietf.org <scitt@ietf.org> Subject: [EXT]Re: [SCITT] Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials Orie, Here is a high-level overview of the authentication mechanism and tracking used today for OASIS, inter-tie electricity scheduling. Everything starts with the NAESB registry (EIR); https://www.naesb.org/pdf4/webregistry_mo_registration_quick_ref_guide_v1.0_0417.pdf Entities involved in inter-tie electricity transactions must register with NAESB’s EIR, see link above. The registration process requires a party to obtain a NAESB compliant X.509 certificate from an accredited certificate authority (ACA); https://www.naesb.org/pdf4/ac_authorities_2022.pdf Entities use their digital certificates for identification in OASIS; https://www.naesbwry.oati.com/NAESBWRY/sys-index.wml Inter-tie transactions are scheduled and tracked, using an E-TAG; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NERC_Tag E-TAG’s are used to “connect the dots” and settle transactions that flow across Balancing Authroities. Hope this helps. Thanks, Dick Brooks Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, Sector Coordinating Council – A Public-Private Partnership Never trust software, always verify and report! ™ http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com Email: dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com Tel: +1 978-696-1788 From: Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries> Sent: Wednesday, August 3, 2022 9:09 AM To: dick <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com> Cc: Steve Lasker <Steve.Lasker=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>; scitt@ietf.org Subject: Re: [SCITT] Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials Thanks! I am interested in applying Verifiable Credentials to energy use cases, even if we don't have customers in that sector today. The calls are open (https://github.com/w3c-ccg/traceability-vocab#meetings), but fair warning that most of the work happens on github async, and we usually just process issues and PRs during call time. There are also aspects of Verifiable Credentials that I believe are relevant to the structure of endorsements / receipts: The concept of "evidence": - https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/#evidence - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-countersign#section-3.1 - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4998 As one example. I am hopeful that the next version of the Verifiable Credentials specification can point more directly to IETF RFCs to make its arguments, even if the json data model can't be updated to support CBOR / COSE as a first class citizen this round. Perhaps the next charter for that WG might support this better, if we pave the way with examples. Regards, OS On Wed, Aug 3, 2022, 7:54 AM Dick Brooks <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com> wrote: I agree. This paper by Orie, Michael, Brian and Mahmoud is very useful as guide for terminology and semantics. I can provide the authors with a description of how we track electricity transactions for inter-tie scheduling, called OASIS a NAESB standard, if interested. Thanks, Dick Brooks Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, Sector Coordinating Council – A Public-Private Partnership Never trust software, always verify and report! ™ http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com Email: dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com Tel: +1 978-696-1788 From: SCITT <scitt-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Steve Lasker Sent: Tuesday, August 2, 2022 8:21 PM To: Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries>; scitt@ietf.org Subject: Re: [SCITT] Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials Very cool, Orie. Love the sandbox experiments From: SCITT <scitt-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Orie Steele Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2022 2:08 PM To: scitt@ietf.org Subject: [SCITT] Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Credentials I made this today: https://github.com/OR13/endor As it says in the readme, this is just a toy example I made up to experiment with. The nice thing about endorsing W3C Verifiable Credentials is that they are already an abstraction that applies to "non software supply chain" use cases... For example, we model cyber physical supply chain flows using them: https://w3id.org/eability There are a number of organizations looking at oil and gas, steel, ecommerce, and agriculture supply chains. Often they will share some common trade documents such as Bills of Lading or Commercial Invoices. These are examples of "SCITT Artifact Types" which you might expect to see across various distinct supply chain use cases. However, as is the case with Oil and Gas needing to account for fluid dynamics, and software needing to account for compilers, build servers and various source files, there are cases where you may need to model components of a supply chain with Verifiable Credentials that are highly specific to the use case. If you can tolerate modeling in RDF, W3C Verifiable Credentials come with a built in abstract data model that integrates well with existing industry ontologies such as: - https://www.ebi.ac.uk/chebi/ - https://qudt.org/ My main complaint against W3C Verifiable Credentials is the limitation to JSON representations, if we could represent RDF in CBOR, we would have the best of both worlds with the main remaining disadvantage being the namespace overhead inherent in RDF. If you drop that, you will likely need some registry or algorithm process for handling collisions and interoperability, but there are various solutions to those problems. If you feel I butchered any of the concepts or terminology, feel free to yell at me here or on github issues, as I said, I made this today, it's not reflective of actual SCITT architecture, it was just to explore the space. Regards, OS -- ORIE STEELE Chief Technical Officer www.transmute.industries -- ORIE STEELE Chief Technical Officer www.transmute.industries -- SCITT mailing list SCITT@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/scitt
- [SCITT] Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable Cre… Orie Steele
- Re: [SCITT] Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable… Steve Lasker
- Re: [SCITT] Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable… Dick Brooks
- Re: [SCITT] Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable… Orie Steele
- Re: [SCITT] Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C Verifiable… Dick Brooks
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Hart, Charlie
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Hart, Charlie
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Dick Brooks
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Dick Brooks
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Steve Lasker
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Orie Steele
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Dick Brooks
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Steve Lasker
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Dick Brooks
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Carl Wallace
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Dick Brooks
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Steve Lasker
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Carl Wallace
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Steve Lasker
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Carl Wallace
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Dick Brooks
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Steve Lasker
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… ProSapien Sam Smith
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Dick Brooks
- Re: [SCITT] [EXT]Re: Endor: A SCITT PoC for W3C V… Carl Wallace