Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-eman-energy-monitoring-mib-10.txt

[Benoit Claise <[e-mail]>]

Dear all,

draft-ietf-eman-energy-monitoring-mib-12 has been posted with the 
correct boilerplate.

Regards, Bneoit

> Hi David, Tero,
>
> Thanks for your review.
> We will post a new draft version with this boilerplate at 
> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/ops/trac/wiki/mib-security
>
> We will also correct "theeoPowerAdminState"
>
> Finally, wrt your comment:
>
>     The formatting of the draft was bit wierd in places (extra ^L in the
>     middle of page etc), but I assume those will be fixed by the RFC
>     editor.
>
> This is one of those legacy draft published with word :-)
>
> Regards, Benoit
>> Hi,
>>
>> comments inline.
>>
>> dbh
>>
>> On Jun 27, 2014, at 9:37 AM, Tero Kivinen<[e-mail]>  wrote:
>>
>>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
>>> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
>>> IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
>>> security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
>>> these comments just like any other last call comments
>>>
>>> This document describes the MIB for energy monitoring. It has mostly
>>> read only information about the current energy use etc, but it also
>>> have one important writable attribute eoPowerAdminState which can be
>>> used to change the power state of the device (shut it down?). The MIB
>>> also have second part which can be used to create notifications and
>>> intervals for enery usage.
>>>
>>> Both of these are pointed out in the security consideations section
>>> and the security considerations section mostly follows the MIB
>>> security guidelines text, but differs in one paragraph. The text in
>>> draft says:
>>>
>>>        It is RECOMMENDED that implementers consider the security
>>>        features as provided by the SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410],
>>>        section 8), including full support for the SNMPv3 cryptographic
>>>        mechanisms (for authentication and privacy).
>> These are the old guidelines.
>>
>>> Where the guidelines text says:
>>>
>>>       Implementations SHOULD provide the security features described
>>>       by the SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410]), and implementations
>>>       claiming compliance to the SNMPv3 standard MUST include full
>>>       support for authentication and privacy via the User-based
>>>       Security Model (USM) [RFC3414] with the AES cipher algorithm
>>>       [RFC3826]. Implementations MAY also provide support for the
>>>       Transport Security Model (TSM) [RFC5591] in combination with a
>>>       secure transport such as SSH [RFC5592] or TLS/DTLS [RFC6353].
>>>
>>> Asking implementors to consider security features is something that
>>> cannot be verified, i.e. there is no way I can see whether the
>>> implementor x actually even considered the security features or not,
>>> thus making RECOMMENDATION to consider security feature is just
>>> stupid.
>> Yeah, but it’s the best that could be negotiated at that point in time.
>>
>>> The guidelines text instead makes SHOULD for providing
>>> security.
>>>
>>> Why is this text changed from the mib-security framework
>>> (http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/ops/trac/wiki/mib-security).
>> The document was probably based on an older mib document.
>> It MIGHT have been based on the templates on the tools page before I got them updated.
>>
>> The document should be updated to the new boilerplate.
>>
>>> Also I think the security considerations section should mention that
>>> almost all of the MIB items do have privacy issues, as for example
>>> reading the power usage of the home TV/PC/game console/washing machine
>>> will give indication whether person is at home, and what he might be
>>> doing. Thus the first paragraph saying "Some objects may be considered
>>> sensitive", I would say most of the objects are sensitive in most
>>> environments.
>> without changing the boilerplate, of course …
>>
>>> Actually it seems to bit dangerous to have mostly read-only
>>> information in MIB where the only read-write item is the very security
>>> sensitive object which can be used to turn the devices off. Especially
>>> when the MIB name is Power and Energy MONITORING MIB. Casual operator
>>> might just check the MIB name and then notice there is lots of
>>> read-only information like "eoPowerNamePlate" or "eoPowerAccuracy",
>>> etc and just assume this is only for monitoring the power usage, and
>>> not notice that it also allows turning device on and off via one
>>> read-write value hidden among the read-only values.
>>>
>>> I would be more happy if that one read-write value would be moved to
>>> separate MIB, but I do not know if there is better place for it. If it
>>> is not moved, then it would be better to change the title of the draft
>>> o say "Power and Energy Monitoring and Control MIB" or something
>>> similar which indicates more clearly that this MIB can be used to
>>> control devices.
>>>
>>> Nits:
>>>
>>> In section 11:
>>>
>>>        - Unauthorized changes to the eoPowerOperState (via
>>>          theeoPowerAdminState ) MAY disrupt the power settings of the
>>> 	 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>>
>>> s/theeoPowerAdminState/the eoPowerAdminState/.
>>>
>>> The formatting of the draft was bit wierd in places (extra ^L in the
>>> middle of page etc), but I assume those will be fixed by the RFC
>>> editor.
>>> -- 
>>> [e-mail]
>>>
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>> .
>>
>