Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09

"R. Atkinson" <rja.lists@gmail.com> Thu, 26 December 2019 19:16 UTC

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From: "R. Atkinson" <rja.lists@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <70FA58C0-97E1-4F76-B88B-A28101A46069@mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2019 14:16:47 -0500
Cc: secdir <secdir@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2.all@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09
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In my experience, many countries other than the US also reference and use/follow many NIST specifications and many NIST recommendations/guidance.

Also, there is some non-governmental commercial pressure to follow NIST specifications, recommendations, & guidance.  For example, insurers of financial sector firms often write a requirement for the insured firm to at least be compliant with listed NIST specifications, recommendations, & guidance as part of the insurance (or re-insurance) policy for a bank, stock brokerage, or such like.

I am not certain, but I think the legal requirement in the US is limited to US Federal Government offices/agencies/departments other than the US Department of Defense.  For example, I do not think there are legal requirements for commercial firms or individual states to follow NIST specifications, recommendations, & guidance.  My understanding, possibly confused, is that US DoD writes its own guidance, at least on cryptographic matters.

Yours,

Ran



> On Dec 25, 2019, at 06:57, Uri Blumenthal <uri@mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> NIST standards are mandatory for a subset of US citizens. But enough of businesses outside the US pay attention to what NIST says to make adding the reference relevant and useful.
> 
>> On Dec 25, 2019, at 01:52, Valery Smyslov <svan@elvis.ru> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Hi Watson,
>>  
>> thank you for spending your time on this review in Christmas Eve.
>>  
>> The capitalization issue has been already noticed and fixed.
>>  
>> I’m not sure the draft should mention NIST levels, because 
>> they are relevant mostly for US customers. I think that 
>> generic recommendations on key sizes are more appropriate
>> for this document.
>>  
>> Regards,
>> Valery.
>>  
>> Damn misclick. I meant With Nits.
>>  
>> On Tue, Dec 24, 2019 at 8:02 PM Watson Ladd via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
>> Reviewer: Watson Ladd
>> Review result: Not Ready
>> 
>> Twas the night before Christmas
>> when all through the house
>> someone was desperately trying to get a review done on time.
>> 
>> I didn't see anything wrong per se in the draft itself, but I found the
>> capitalization of quantum computer an odd choice. IKEv2 is a complicated
>> protocol, and I am not 100% sure that this draft does what we want it to: It
>> would be great if someone could check very carefully in some symbolic model,
>> ala what has been done in TLS. The guidance on sizes seems to rule out NIST
>> level 1, but not any higher levels: might be worth calling out this explicitly.
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
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>> wiki: http://tools.ietf.org/area/sec/trac/wiki/SecDirReview
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
>> --Rousseau.
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