[secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09

Watson Ladd via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Wed, 25 December 2019 04:01 UTC

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Date: Tue, 24 Dec 2019 20:01:50 -0800
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Subject: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09
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Reviewer: Watson Ladd
Review result: Not Ready

Twas the night before Christmas
when all through the house
someone was desperately trying to get a review done on time.

I didn't see anything wrong per se in the draft itself, but I found the
capitalization of quantum computer an odd choice. IKEv2 is a complicated
protocol, and I am not 100% sure that this draft does what we want it to: It
would be great if someone could check very carefully in some symbolic model,
ala what has been done in TLS. The guidance on sizes seems to rule out NIST
level 1, but not any higher levels: might be worth calling out this explicitly.