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Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-06

Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org> Mon, 03 May 2021 14:47 UTC

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From: Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>
Date: Mon, 03 May 2021 10:47:30 -0400
Message-ID: <CAJU8_nX-Timmuvv=vBpgXHYnbCLAd2ug-=BLy_Xp08ehLkGv9w@mail.gmail.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>, IETF SecDir <secdir@ietf.org>, Ops Area WG <opsawg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds.all@ietf.org, Last Call <last-call@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-06
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On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 10:40 AM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

>
> Understood. I'm not suggesting the web PKI be used to authenticate IP
> address space ownership. I'm suggesting that the following chain would be
> sufficient:
>
>  * RPKI authenticates the routing information, which includes the IP
> address space and the https URLs for each geofeed file.
>  * Web PKI authenticates the data served at that URL.
>  * Client verifies that the IP ranges in the geofeed data are contained
> within the (RPKI-authenticated) routing information.
>
>
> This is not quite right.  It is true that theWebPKI provide authentication
> and integrity when https:// is used, but this is not required.  If http://
> were used, and the file was modified in transit by an attacker, the RPKI
> signature check would fail.
>

Yes. Which is why I'm suggesting that you mandate https.

I'm obviously not aware of the potential operational complications of doing
so, as I don't work in this area. There may be good reasons why this is
impractical. The tradeoff, however, is a more complex client ecosystem,
which must accommodate two authentication methods instead of one.

Kyle

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