Re: [Secdispatch] [EXTERNAL]Re: Can Composite sigs move back to LAMPS?

[Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]>]

On Sat, Jan 18, 2020 at 1:13 PM Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>
wrote:

>
> Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:
>     mcr> In particular, it seems to me that we could add these multiple
>     mcr> entries to
>     mcr> certificates, using dummy algorithms, and test them in the field
>     mcr> against
>     mcr> existing browsers, web servers, IDS, firewalls, etc.
>
>     > It's not quite clear to me how this would work. As I understand it,
>     > this involves replacing the existing public keys and signatures, in
>     > which case they won't be acceptable to any Web browser (and you in
>     > fact won't be able to get BR-compliant certs)....
>
> No, it involves two sets of signatures.
> The traditional set and the new, yet-to-be-precisely-defined set.
>

Yes, but I had understood these tbe encoded on the wire as if they were a
new signature algorithm, with the result that such a certificate would not
be verifiable by an existing client.

Perhaps we should resolve this question first.

-Ekr





> It could be that CAFORUM rules would presently prevent these certificates
> From going into production, and during an experiment, that would be okay, I
> think.
>
> The reason to start this work now is to wring out the obsticales such as
> BR/CABFORUM rules that would prevent/slow-down adoption.
>
> --
> Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>, Sandelman Software Works
>  -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
>
>
>
>