Re: [sidr] Comment on draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-01

Danny McPherson <danny@tcb.net> Wed, 16 November 2011 00:56 UTC

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From: Danny McPherson <danny@tcb.net>
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Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 19:56:29 -0500
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To: Pradosh Mohapatra <pmohapat@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] Comment on draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-01
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On Nov 15, 2011, at 6:39 PM, Pradosh Mohapatra wrote:

> Can you describe specific concerns you have with using extended community?
> It does work with confederations.

Confederation in this context was referring to the _current inability 
of BGPSEC to natively accommodate AS confederations, or IBGP 
in general, for that matter, where Member-ASes commonly apply
'policy' at Member-ASBRs and no implicit transitive trust relationship
would exist.

While I don't want to overly conflate this function with that issue, it 
does intersect in that Opaque Extended Communities already assume 
a transitive trust relationship and in a world where the value of an Opaque 
Extended Community would be used to convey the validation state of a 
prefix an IBGP speaker has no way to validate the semantic integrity of 
the string.  Its essentially what I have today, and into the future secure
routing should enable me to verify this.

> Do you have alternatives in mind for incremental deployment case?

I'm not sure what you mean by "incremental deployment" here, are
you referring to the case where it gets enabled and deployed but 
no IBGP speaker applies policy based on the validation state until 
all IBGP speakers support prefix origin validation capability as defined 
in the document?  I suspect this is what S3.1 is implicitly conveying.

I'm not convinced incremental deployment of the validation state 
processing capability within IBGP should be supported.  The current 
Deployment Considerations section makes me uneasy in that it's 
essentially saying "if you don't support this Opaque value and 
decision algorithm modification as prescribed in S.3 then you should 
develop static policy maps that influences the best path selection *the 
same way* as what would have been enabled by an implementation
of this extension." -- i.e., that may not even be feasible in some 
operating environments and the complexity it presents is likely 
conducive to misconfiguration that introduce forwarding loops in
the network.

Does that make sense?

-danny