Re: [sidr] Terry Manderson's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-11: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Robert Kisteleki <robert@ripe.net> Fri, 20 May 2016 11:32 UTC

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To: George Michaelson <ggm@algebras.org>
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From: Robert Kisteleki <robert@ripe.net>
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Date: Fri, 20 May 2016 13:32:39 +0200
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Subject: Re: [sidr] Terry Manderson's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-11: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Chiming it late...

On 2016-05-19 0:39, George Michaelson wrote:
> I would rather the sigs were signed by ee certs which were in the
> blob, than have to make an external reference and I would rather we
> varied the compliance needs to remove a pointless external ref.
> 
> If there has to be a ref, I think making it mandated to a specific
> scheme is over specifying, especially in a context where we might
> begin to understand *where you get cryptographic materials from is
> less important than proving who said them*.
> 
> Rsync is a bad fit. for the actual signing cert, Inline is better. It
> can refer to whatever chain it likes.
> 
> -G

In the good ol' days a reference was put in because while the signature
itself is relatively small, including the full EE cert would bloat the whole
RPSL object to potentially multiple times its original size -- and for those
who don't care about signatures this is a huge overhead. Furthermore, if one
would reuse EE certs in multiple signatures (I don't see why that would be
prohibited -- for example if I want to sign multiple objects at the same
time), then this method makes even more sense.

Then the whole back-and-forth started about whether it should be rsync or
http(s) and now perhaps it's neither. It feels like we're going around in
circles here :)

Robert