Re: [sidr] route leaks message to IDR

[Eric Osterweil <[e-mail]>]

On Mar 21, 2012, at 12:45 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote:

> On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 12:36 PM, Brian Dickson
> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 12:10 PM, Christopher Morrow
>> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 11:50 AM, Brian Dickson
>>> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 11:37 AM, Montgomery, Douglas <[e-mail]>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> By "we" I assume you are asking the bigger question about what the
>>>>> broad
>>>>> requirements / objectives should be.
>>>>> 
>>>>> The current BGPSEC design, chooses to only focus on the protocol on the
>>>>> wire, and starts with the attributes that had both an identified threat
>>>>> and a existence proof of a reasonable mechanism to address that threat.
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> If that statement were true, I think there would be much more support
>>>> and
>>>> progress
>>>> for the bgpsec-protocol component of the SIDR WG.
>>>> 
>>>> However, the current interpretation (by whom, is not clear) seems to be,
>>>> that only certain attributes (AS-path and nothing else?) are included in
>>>> what is protected.
>>>> 
>>>> Any attempt to discuss inclusion of other attributes, and reasonable
>>>> mechanisms
>>>> for including those in the protection regime, has been shouted down by a
>>>> small group
>>>> which includes a self-selected group of implementers.
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> you seem to want to read:
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sriram-bgpsec-design-choices-01
>>> 

Actually, with respect, I think the first stop really ought to be coming to consensus on a requirements document.  My experience has been that doing design work without solid requirements can lead to a great deal of rework.

Eric