Re: [sidr] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-11: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Brian Haberman <brian@innovationslab.net> Wed, 18 May 2016 16:06 UTC

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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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From: Brian Haberman <brian@innovationslab.net>
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Date: Wed, 18 May 2016 12:06:29 -0400
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Cc: sidr@ietf.org, sidr-chairs@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig@ietf.org, "Sandra L. Murphy" <sandy@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: [sidr] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-11: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Hiya Stephen,

On 5/18/16 11:51 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-11: Discuss
> 
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> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig/
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> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> 
> I'd like to check one thing - this may be needed for strict
> compliance with RPKI thing but it seems kinda weird to also
> impose that here, but anyway...
> 
> Is 3.2 step 1 needed?  That seems like useless complexity
> here.  If it is needed, how does the verifier check that
> it's really a single-use? I don't see the point TBH.
> 

This text was driven by the statement in RFC 6487 (Section 3) that says:

   The private key associated with an EE certificate is used to sign a
   single RPKI signed object, i.e., the EE certificate is used to
   validate only one object.

Step 1 in 3.2 is there so that this approach follows the above directive
on the use of the RPKI infrastructure/certificates.

Regards,
Brian