[sidr] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-11: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

"Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Wed, 18 May 2016 15:51 UTC

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Subject: [sidr] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-11: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-11: Discuss

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DISCUSS:
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I'd like to check one thing - this may be needed for strict
compliance with RPKI thing but it seems kinda weird to also
impose that here, but anyway...

Is 3.2 step 1 needed?  That seems like useless complexity
here.  If it is needed, how does the verifier check that
it's really a single-use? I don't see the point TBH.


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COMMENT:
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- If you keep the potential for http(s) URIs then I think
more text is needed in the security considerations but
it looks like you're taking that out for now so I guess
that's ok. 

- 2.1, I don't see why it's useful to allow variation in the
fields of the signature attribute e.g. why "MAY" the version
not be 1st?

- 2.1, "t=" and "x=" any limits on precision here?
(Non-)support for fractional seconds can be a source for
non-interop if not. The "All times MUST be converted to" is
also actually a little ambiguous as you don't say to do that
before signing;-)

- 2.1, "a=" did you want a lowercase "must" there?

- Are steps 2 and 3 in 3.1 order-sensitive? I think you
might sometimes need to do 2 after 3, or re-do 2 maybe or
else leading whitspace could be an issue. Maybe say that
sometimes you need to do step 2 >1 time?  

- 3.1, oops, an ambiguity - in "The following steps MUST be
applied in order..." does "in order" mean "in the order
below" or "so as to"? I assume the latter.

- 3.1: In general I think you'd be better if you pointed at
specific bits of text in all the RFCs mentioned in 3.1 -
it's maybe easy to get wrong otherwise, esp. if we don't yet
have >1 implementation. 

- 3.1, step 6: names are all ASCII right? just checking

- 3.2, step 1 - given 3.3 step 2, you're missing a step to
"publish the cert" at the c= location as well.