RE: [Sip] Re: RLS and identity

Milinski Alexander <alexander.milinski@siemens.com> Thu, 25 November 2004 08:17 UTC

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From: Milinski Alexander <alexander.milinski@siemens.com>
To: 'Adam Roach' <adam@nostrum.com>
Subject: RE: [Sip] Re: RLS and identity
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2004 09:04:56 +0100
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Dear Adam, 
3GPP Rel-6 is close to freezing, thus I would not expect any more major changes. Also, it seems that backward compatibility would need to be addressed.
In other words: I believe your proposal is not realistic.
Regards,
Alexander

P.S. Once Dean has cleaned up all SIP evils, there will certainly be the opportunity to consider also other major changes ... :-)

-----Original Message-----
From: sip-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:sip-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Adam Roach
Sent: Thursday, November 25, 2004 4:18 AM
To: Adam Roach
Cc: SIP WG; Aki Niemi
Subject: Re: [Sip] Re: RLS and identity


Adam Roach wrote:

> Based on Rohan's suggestion, the text will effectively say:
>
> - Jon's Identity draft will be mandatory to implement, optional to use.
>
> - Other mechanisms that have properties such that they can adequately
>   convey the identity of the subscriber and the permission of the RLS
>   to subscribe on the user's behalf can also be used.

As a clarification, I have received specific guidance from the area 
directors that the draft cannot contain anything about such alternate 
mechanisms, even if they are not specifically mentioned by name. The use 
of e.g. P-Asserted-Identity will need to be a modification that 3GPP 
specifically calls out relative to the draft.

Of course, since the identity work is basically done and works so much 
better than P-Asserted-Identity, there could be a very valid argument 
made that 3GPP R6 should abandon the inherently insecure 
P-Asserted-Identity mechanism in favor of the cryptographically secure 
SIP Identity mechanism.

/a

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_______________________________________________
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