RE: How to handle Validation failures was RE: [Sipping-emergency]proposed charter, new wg on emergency

"James M. Polk" <jmpolk@cisco.com> Wed, 29 September 2004 00:42 UTC

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Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2004 19:12:08 -0500
To: wilcox@e911.psd.state.vt.us, Henning Schulzrinne <hgs@cs.columbia.edu>
From: "James M. Polk" <jmpolk@cisco.com>
Subject: RE: How to handle Validation failures was RE: [Sipping-emergency]proposed charter, new wg on emergency
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At 09:06 AM 9/28/2004 -0400, wilcox@e911.psd.state.vt.us wrote:
>I agree with non-interfering testing end to end.
>
>Ultimately, routing of a call does not stop at an ECC. For all practical 
>purposes it also derives a means for determining the correct response, 
>which is part of the message relay (incorporating emergency responders in 
>the chain). Validation of location information also ensures that the 
>correct response recommendation is assigned. Take for example two 
>locations that reside side-by-side, one is a residence and the other is a 
>nuclear power plant.

What if the residential caller is calling about the power plant that is on 
fire?

;-)

>For the residence, a standard response for fire apparatus is fine however, 
>for the nuclear power plant an entirely different response scenario may be 
>necessary (perhaps the fire department located at the facility itself). If 
>the call is routed to the ECC responsible for that location without 
>validation of that location information (and ultimately validation of 
>responder information), there will be no indication that a different 
>response is necessary and correct routing of the call has not been 
>accomplished. Currently, this is accomplished in the US 9-1-1 system by 
>assigning a special zone (ESZ) to that location and assigning an indicator 
>(ESN) to that location that derives the correct police, fire and EMS response.
>
>
>
>To give you a real world example: Ford Motor Company just selected to 
>replace all of their traditional phone systems with VoIP service (50,000+ 
>end devices). You can bet that in some of the larger plants, they have 
>their own responders for Police, Fire and EMS services.
>
>
>
>Nate
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Henning Schulzrinne [mailto:hgs@cs.columbia.edu]
>Sent: Tue 9/28/2004 8:29 AM
>To: wilcox@e911.psd.state.vt.us
>Cc: Peterson, Jon; sipping-emergency@ietf.org
>Subject: Re: How to handle Validation failures was RE: 
>[Sipping-emergency]proposed charter, new wg on emergency
>
>
>
>         This can be seen as a special case of testing. Thus, if you 
> assume that
>         there is a test mode that attempts to reach the PSAP, but does not
>         actually ring, you'd have tested the full routing chain, including
>         whether the civic address is indeed mappable.
>
>         A separate question is whether a separate address-only validation 
> mode
>         is appropriate. This probably depends on the overall architecture. As
>         we've discussed before, I think there is general agreement that you'd
>         want the ability for end-to-end non-interfering testing in any event.
>
>         wilcox@e911.psd.state.vt.us wrote:
>         > Validating location information is implicit for routing. Otherwise,
>         > all calls would be treated as "default" routed or worse, would rely
>         > on other mechanisms to provide routing instructions outside the
>         > control of the ECC (the ECC currently provides instructions and 
> input
>         > on the construct of the MSAG to the extent possible, which is used
>         > for the validation process). Unvalidated location information could
>         > reduce or even prevent a timely emergency response to a particular
>         > location. As I implied before, the lack of validation should not
>         > prevent delivery of a call to a geographically appropriate ECC
>         > however, all efforts need to be made to ensure that end devices
>         > utilize validated location information. So, if the charter of this
>         > effort is to decide on how routing is accomplished than 
> validation of
>         > the information used to make that routing decision should be
>         > considered in the process as well.
>         >
>         > Nate
>
>
>
>_______________________________________________
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cheers,
James

                                *******************
                 Truth is not to be argued... it is to be presented


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