Re: [Sipping] WG: [VOIPSEC] VoIP Spam paper

Henning Schulzrinne <hgs@cs.columbia.edu> Mon, 26 November 2007 00:09 UTC

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From: Henning Schulzrinne <hgs@cs.columbia.edu>
To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Subject: Re: [Sipping] WG: [VOIPSEC] VoIP Spam paper
Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2007 19:09:19 -0500
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In addition, there are many legitimate callers that fall into the  
outbound-only category, such as notification systems that are becoming  
increasingly popular, from things as mundane as your-flight-is-late  
and your-dentist-appointment-is-tomorrow to important and time- 
critical as student-with-gun-on-the-loose or a-forest-fire-is-heading- 
your-way.

Henning

On Nov 25, 2007, at 8:32 AM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:

> Hi  all
>
> BACKGROUND
>
> In the IETF SIPPING WG we had discussions regarding SPIT prevention  
> mechanism. Particularly with regard to the SPIT marking techniques  
> it seems that there is some disagreement about the usefulness of  
> statistical techniques. A number of ideas have been discussed  
> already on various IETF mailing lists.
> I would like to bring another paper to your attention that has been  
> posted to the VOIPSEC mailing list.
>
> THE PAPER
>
> The paper says that it exploit the fact that in regular  
> communication users both make and receive calls, while spammers are  
> interested in only making calls and disseminating information. This  
> paper takes existing work from the email environment and applies it  
> to VoIP (as it seems).
>
> The basic idea is to observe communication and call duration in  
> particular. Thereby, the call duration is used to create, so-called  
> call credentials. A call credential CC consists of A, the identity  
> of the caller, B, the identity of the call recipient, t, the call  
> duration and TS, the time stamp of the call along with a digital  
> signature of the same information.
>
> Although not stated explicitly, I assume that information about a  
> users call patters are stored with its VoIP provider. Then, when a  
> user makes a call information about the call patters (i.e., in the  
> form of call credentials) are made available to the receiving domain  
> or other end point. Sharing information about the sender with the  
> recipient's domain or the recipient itself has been described in http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-schwartz-sipping-spit-saml-01.txt 
>  (although no reference to that document is included in the paper).  
> This work on utilizing social networks, as described in http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ono-trust-path-discovery-02.txt 
> , might also be applicable.
>
> To deal with the introduction problem turing tests are suggested.
>
> Working on draft-schwartz-sipping-spit-saml-01.txt we encountered  
> problems, such as
>
> * Deployment challenge to get SPIT SAML to deploy. Without it being  
> widely deployed the receiving domain does not have a way to know  
> anything about the call statistics. Hence, the mechanism would only  
> work within a single domain. Without sufficient deployment the  
> mechanisms described in the paper wouldn't be so useful either. As  
> such, this deployment challenge has nothing todo with SAML but is  
> rather a generic problem with the solution approach outlined in the  
> paper (although the authors claim it differently in Section 2.4  
> "Related Work").
>
> * Privacy aspects: It is not clear whether it is actually possible  
> to distribute some of this information from one domain to another  
> one without violating some privacy laws.
>
> * Trusting the information provided by the sending domain is likely  
> to work only for larger VoIP providers. In the worst case the  
> Spammer might provide this information since he is acting as a VoIP  
> provider.
>
> The idea of using call patterns for SPIT prevention is not new.  
> Still, the provided details for using the call duration (using the  
> Eigentrust algorithm) in a SPIT prevention scenario are nice. Maybe  
> this paper provides a different spin to our SPIT marking discussion.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> PS: http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-schwartz-sipping-spit-saml-01.txt  
> did not describe which algorithms to use to compute some of the  
> parameters.
> I believe that this is fine for an IETF document given that there  
> are a lot of implementation specific aspects that are not relevant  
> for standardization.
>
>
> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> Von: voipsec-bounces@voipsa.org [mailto:voipsec-bounces@voipsa.org]  
> Im Auftrag von ext vijay arvind
> Gesendet: Montag, 12. November 2007 00:34
> An: voipsec@voipsa.org
> Betreff: [VOIPSEC] VoIP Spam paper
>
> Hello All,
>
> Attached is a link to a VoIP spam approach that we at the Georgia Tech
> Information Security center (GTISC) are working on and was presented  
> at the
> 4th conference of Email and Anti Spam:
> http://www.ceas.cc/2007/papers/paper-63.pdf
>
> The basic idea is to try and exploit the fact that in regular  
> communication
> users both make and receive calls, while spammers are interested in  
> only
> making calls and disseminating information. Users rarely call a  
> spammer and
> even if they inadvertently do so, the call will last for a small  
> duration.
> Hence we use call duration and the directionality of calling  
> patterns to
> distinguish between a regular user and a spammer. We use basic  
> cryptographic
> primitives to encapsulate call duration as call credentials. How we  
> combine
> these call credentials using social networking theory and the  
> Eigentrust
> algorithm (PageRank) to create a spammer detecting mechanism forms  
> the crux
> of the paper.
>
> Bouquets and Brickbats are most welcome.
>
> Thanks,
> Vijay
> _______________________________________________
> Voipsec mailing list
> Voipsec@voipsa.org
> http://voipsa.org/mailman/listinfo/voipsec_voipsa.org
>
>
>
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