Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm
"Don Johnson" <djohnson@certicom.com> Mon, 22 February 1999 16:06 UTC
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From: Don Johnson <djohnson@certicom.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com>
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Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:07:32 -0500
Subject: Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm
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Russ, Here are some thoughts. 1. Use of HMAC (using SHA-1) versus simple SHA-1 of the key may give security properties that are easier to show and be more conforming to existing stds. It can also grow easier, one never knows how these things might grow. 2. You need to indicate if the parity bits are checked or not on recovery. I suggest that they should be checked, since they are set. This provides some more integrity. 3. The use of fixed IV's means that the first block of each encryption is less protected than the subsequent blocks. This makes analysis more difficult. If I were going to attack this method, I would concentrate on the less protected blocks, trying to find a match after less than 2**32 encryptions. This is not a complete idea but may be a start. That is, the middle 2 blocks seem to collide in 2**32 encryptions, but the end blocks might collide sooner. 4. I still think you should try to list some goals for this method. For example, 64 bits of integrity, every bit depends on every other bit, confidentiality for key, etc. Don Johnson Russ Housley <housley@spyrus.com> on 02/20/99 04:17:39 PM To: ietf-smime@imc.org cc: burt@RSA.COM, djohnson@certicom.ca, schneier@counterpane.com, denny@tis.com, denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu, omura@cylink.com, mhetzel@bell-labs.com, benaloh@microsoft.com, brickell@certco.com, smatyas@us.ibm.com, paulv@entrust.com, merkle@parc.xerox.com, berson@anagram.com, desmedt@uwm.edu, rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu, carlisle.adams@entrust.com, ams@terisa.com, ekr@rtfm.com, Blake.greenlee@greenlee.com, cme@ACM.ORG, bfox@microsoft.com, acc@tycho.ncsc.mil, bschanni@BayNetworks.com, dickie@EMPIRE.eclipse.ncsc.mil, jhs@tycho.ncsc.mil, jis@mit.edu, pcain@bbn.com, kent@bbn.com, BSnow@radium.ncsc.mil, cjwagne@missi.ncsc.mil, balenson@tis.com, balenson@tis.com, jlinn@securitydynamics.com, smid@csmes.ncsl.nist.gov, daw@cs.berkeley.edu (bcc: Don Johnson/Certicom) Subject: Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm All: Right now, I am leaning toward the double encryption wrap algorithm. I think it will be easy to implement, and it yeilds a shorter result that the OAEP method. To convince myself that it was easy to implement, I did an implementation. It took me about two hours while watching an old Jimmy Stewart movie. Of course, I already have SHA-1 and Triple-DES CBC routines. S/MIME v3 will require these algorithms for other capabilities besides key wrapping. If someone else is willing to do an implementation, I would like to compare results. This will allow a test vector to be included with the algorithm description. Does anyone have any strong objections to the double encryption wrap algorithm being selected? Russ >WRAP ALOGRITHM #1: DOUBLE ENCRYPTION > >Key Checksum > >The CMS Checksum Algorithm is used to provide an content-encryption key >integrity check value. The algorithm is: > >1. Compute a 20 octet SHA-1 message digest on the > content-encryption key. >2. Use the most significant (first) eight octets of the > message digest value as the checksum value. > >Triple-DES Key Wrap > >1. Set odd parity for each of the DES key octets comprising > the content-encryption key, call the result CEK. >2. Compute a 8 octet key checksum value on CEK as described above, > call the result ICV. >3. Let CEKICV = CEK || ICV. >4. Encrypt CEKICV in CBC mode using the key-encryption key. Use > an IV of 0xc302e3c1ad8bb738. >5. Reverse the order of the ciphertext octets. That is, the most > significant (first) octet is swapped with the least significant > (last) octet, and so on. Call the result TEMP. >6. Encrypt TEMP in CBC mode using the key-encryption key. Use > an IV of 0x61a197e5b132e196. The ciphertext is 32 octets long.
- A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bruce Schneier
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Burt Kaliski
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Dr Stephen Henson
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Carl Ellison
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Peter Gutmann
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Peter Gutmann
- RE: Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm bartley.o'malley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm David Wagner
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Carl Ellison
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Snow, Brian D.
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Peter Gutmann
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm David Wagner
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Stephen Kent
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Burt Kaliski
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Burt Kaliski
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Peter Gutmann
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Jim Schaad (Exchange)
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Dr Stephen Henson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm EKR
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Russ Housley
- New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Section Russ Housley
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Paul Van Oorschot
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Kevin Kingdon
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Don Johnson
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Bob Jueneman
- Re: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Peter Gutmann
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Burt Kaliski
- RE: A New Triple-DES Key Wrap Algorithm Tolga Acar