[lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-x509-slhdsa-04.txt

Sophie Schmieg <sschmieg@google.com> Wed, 09 April 2025 21:57 UTC

Return-Path: <sschmieg@google.com>
X-Original-To: spasm@mail2.ietf.org
Delivered-To: spasm@mail2.ietf.org
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1DE0119D756C for <spasm@mail2.ietf.org>; Wed, 9 Apr 2025 14:57:13 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at ietf.org
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -17.6
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.6 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_MED=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, ENV_AND_HDR_SPF_MATCH=-0.5, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL=-7.5, USER_IN_DEF_SPF_WL=-7.5] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: mail2.ietf.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com
Received: from mail2.ietf.org ([166.84.6.31]) by localhost (mail2.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uY3ZfCHMZxxh for <spasm@mail2.ietf.org>; Wed, 9 Apr 2025 14:57:12 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-qt1-x836.google.com (mail-qt1-x836.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::836]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B2C2A19D7565 for <spasm@ietf.org>; Wed, 9 Apr 2025 14:57:12 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-qt1-x836.google.com with SMTP id d75a77b69052e-4774611d40bso100601cf.0 for <spasm@ietf.org>; Wed, 09 Apr 2025 14:57:12 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20230601; t=1744235832; x=1744840632; darn=ietf.org; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=itI2tLDw4JThmIwejnfLr0mKNmfeOsDkB1kkgENd4Qg=; b=z1c4GLJ7dAFgkKpUOaciRoJiFC5A5vntyEV2RrJHR/shoN1uHZDP4KbEjnyI6KEmjb URwZ5rHu4WV9cRyWAw0VT1q/0EunOwzoo6ZuPuPXRDtnmQy6D0P4+KFreu1uhWDWwnEb qIipvelbBikEGEtvZs4Kv8E57QuF4aHbtwG12vRtu4jzeL4D18Yv4psEThhZFe9NLWUx AYkwfh9QWb441qNe7L0B24xebes+jFfbE4+LCSdbS0HTraWWsSwc+r8q6ahyIRuRTtt9 9Q/zrPVYe2jpMoqibCpucg3fkR0Dl9AtxkmDjX5ymKot3Q3Qdf21frYrQYRzYUnr6w3U EnIg==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1744235832; x=1744840632; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=itI2tLDw4JThmIwejnfLr0mKNmfeOsDkB1kkgENd4Qg=; b=ZwsKGfbAU1vO8cn/fjzpjsZb2FWAzMF7faTgon/+U0cXLiSLTbFrFWI6QcQO/sQEM/ D10GuSJRkBF42YH0xhFFSe2Hni/EJRVp0q2/vvuTsWS0Cyi6EMx9OV2Tic4Th1GgBNML 6yN7vHPN9/5TrB7b6HxgEkYIkiANAthvgONX9lSigr11eLg7sum0b44TWI42iHsCRgla vs114l1q10eDbMPXU6wYpvwzyobM8doyHbhocCGcwDa50T4bCD3TeqGsnkVcVelTt8fu +M1K+TWBlhaZmCKehQL4YPqezumxsCdEFEVqe47RuoqhrjUjnKX4J8K5RFYmEWIodpll DD7Q==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yzi771VkpTfn0KwMnS8oRNPKqe/PkOTsCAPPjDS6sfY4mc+YOCs 5cSHruVn2L3B/FkWk9LmAKmq5IRyiI9L1H/nlv3yqpOXAT7nN+rQnnsIC/KwleFzQ9KN2/LAyfK zNoYRgcbCUti76+ppbnTTXpjcbsBY0M0SaR+p
X-Gm-Gg: ASbGnctDih529ICinkAuUNJCfv1fgxfkTW2Kk6YrJJhg/3CP3Zv8G50VEjmXEDw83b3 aMzXgajCHs2KLw8XBJkJHx1Nl8kOK3ARygYWmTerdiqcwNT/5Kd2QGFDIrdi8fteteD9bw6LBII 00ynSPvPUVfUySRXRJXUNA3sy50P9MSVexMj6vOla4V77AHVshhc6S
X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IFkM1vRb/BbXQcouUdaukJhApLESw0TuVDgqYtFL1Nfcg44KggcDd04mLJS1bJjB7oAVGvQaA17yUOSOk+P0Fk=
X-Received: by 2002:a05:622a:1887:b0:472:915:a200 with SMTP id d75a77b69052e-4796c973acamr845261cf.28.1744235832064; Wed, 09 Apr 2025 14:57:12 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <174223063931.385816.3602373685012148547@dt-datatracker-5b9b68c5b6-zxk6z> <ead8df8b-00ed-4ba6-875e-0818d68a2556@cryptonext-security.com> <8D6B5222-7DBD-4288-8A45-18EEF57941C8@vigilsec.com> <b12b064d-82db-4358-a975-f2b189bde46d@crypto4a.com> <CYYPR11MB8388087F952F88E0CECB84B8EAA12@CYYPR11MB8388.namprd11.prod.outlook.com> <16C9A8E5-1F67-4AB2-9E03-280EA91A59E6@vigilsec.com> <DU0PR03MB8696BDBD1D448581F01B234986A02@DU0PR03MB8696.eurprd03.prod.outlook.com> <73D55A45-EBEA-43B5-B3F6-0C47D116DED6@vigilsec.com> <B9CFD65B-2E9A-45BD-BF27-7F3097742A7C@vigilsec.com> <9883.1744225252@obiwan.sandelman.ca> <6273.1744231487@obiwan.sandelman.ca>
In-Reply-To: <6273.1744231487@obiwan.sandelman.ca>
From: Sophie Schmieg <sschmieg@google.com>
Date: Wed, 09 Apr 2025 14:57:00 -0700
X-Gm-Features: ATxdqUEEpClSpnWjeN5FNKa1Jh8B2J0N3pBjbvp1iTPcIHtdnEPGUjOIFycVVTQ
Message-ID: <CAEEbLAaF3MBWdTxmHV2vSbsjTF2M3=svUzoosGCJ_NA1YczPGg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000002d617706325f8dab"
Message-ID-Hash: 2564JU4IUWB6DVBXR3FLCTDO5QMMT7JZ
X-Message-ID-Hash: 2564JU4IUWB6DVBXR3FLCTDO5QMMT7JZ
X-MailFrom: sschmieg@google.com
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-spasm.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
CC: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Precedence: list
Subject: [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-x509-slhdsa-04.txt
List-Id: This is the mail list for the LAMPS Working Group <spasm.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/3AvakWREid-MUBDzOwUnvDy52qA>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm>
List-Help: <mailto:spasm-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:spasm-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:spasm@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:spasm-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:spasm-leave@ietf.org>

My main objection to prehash mode as defined for HashML-DSA and HashSLH-DSA
is that they are underdefined for signature schemes, and people end up
trusting the message itself to determine how it is supposed to be verified.
This objection does not apply if the hash function is specified in the
public key, as it should be (The public key should be a *full* description
of the algorithm used, with no parameters left undecided and determined by
the message). For HashML-DSA there is the additional point that it is
simply superfluous as external-µ exists. For HashSLH-DSA there is an
argument about collision resistance of hash functions not being required
for SLH-DSA to be secure, but the lack of any external-µ equivalent makes a
construction like HashSLH-DSA pretty much necessary. As long as we define
the hash function in the public key, I am happy there.

On Wed, Apr 9, 2025 at 1:45 PM Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
wrote:

>
> Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote:
>     > It seems that for general signatures (CMS, COSE, JOSE, ...) that
> additional
>     > OIDs are desired and not harmful.  For RFC5280 certificates, it's
> extra
>     > complexity in a system that is already complex.
>
> It also seems that we could forbid pre-hash OIDs in certificates, while
> allowing them in CRLs.
>
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
>            Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list -- spasm@ietf.org
> To unsubscribe send an email to spasm-leave@ietf.org
>


-- 

Sophie Schmieg | Information Security Engineer | ISE Crypto |
sschmieg@google.com