[lamps] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-x509-slhdsa-04.txt

David Hook <dgh@bouncycastle.org> Thu, 03 April 2025 04:45 UTC

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From: David Hook <dgh@bouncycastle.org>
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Subject: [lamps] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-x509-slhdsa-04.txt
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For what it's worth, we support both the Hash forms and the pure forms 
in Bouncy Castle. We won't be enforcing the PKIX restrictions either, 
not so much as we may or may not disagree, but our libraries aren't just 
used with the PKIX profile. Additionally, one of NISTs given reasons for 
the Hash forms was to also deal with situations where the public key 
might not be available on signature generation and we need our APIs to 
be able to interoperate with people in that situation (yes I know a 
situation like that sounds weird, but when you've been working on an 
open source API for as long as I have, you realize weird happens, 
occasionally even for surprisingly good reasons...).

Regards,

David

On 3/4/25 14:17, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 02, 2025 at 05:40:01PM +0000, Kampanakis, Panos wrote:
>> Hi Viktor,
>>
>> Background info: I was also proponent of allowing HashML-DSA and
>> HashSLH-DSA in X.509 since we have the OIDs anyway and in order to
>> have parity for the case where a CRL or a large cert had to be signed.
>> But there was a long debate in the LAMPS WG regarding ML-DSA, and
>> ExtMu came out as the option that reached rough consensus. I buy the
>> arguments for ExtMu, but like you, I do not find them much more
>> compelling compared to the ones for HashML-DSA. Regardless, the ship
>> sailed regarding the ML-DSA in X.509 draft, unless there is a
>> compelling argument not made before.
> Well, to me the compelling argument is that the restrictions needlessly
> complicate deployments, and pollute APIs with unnatural constraints.
> Use of exteranl μ is of course transparent to the verifier, so if/when
> it works for a particular use-case, by all means go for it.  But
> prohibition of the alternatives makes little sense to me.
>
> Some verifier implementations still support RSA-1024 with SHA1, and
> we're seriously saying that ML-DSA with a SHA2 or SHA3 prehash, is a
> security risk in PKIX, by failing to salt the hash value with the
> issuer's public key???
>
>> Given than SLH-DSA does not have the same ExtMu elegance, I think it
>> makes sense for HashSLH-DSA to be supported in the SLH-DSA in X.509
>> draft.
> FWIW, one man's elegance is another man's hack.  But sure, the
> HashSLH-DSA variants should be allowed in PKIX.  And, if sanity
> prevails, so should the HashML-DSA variants.
>