Re: [Syslog] Some revised text for syslog TLS

Tom,

inline...

<snip>

> > Do you or somebody else on this list (Tom?) have a clue why it may
be
> > useful to carry out such a check? (EDIT: check of IP address)
> 
> You have lost me here.  Suppose I am a server and I want to check that
> syslog
> only comes from someone I trust so I will configure an identifier in
> the server
> and want security credentials to authenticate an assertion of that
> identity.
> The IP address is the identity, and the certificate the security
> credential.
> 
> Or the host name is the identity and the certificate the security
> credential.
> 
> Or the MAC address is the identity and the certificate the security
> credential.
> 
> I do not see a difference (except that some identities are commoner
> than others
> as Pasi points out).

What is common is a big point. I think ipAddress inside certificates is
quite uncommon, so this may be a good indication that it doesn't justify
a MUST.

I have also thought about when this may be used at all. IMHO, this makes
only sense if the transport sender uses a proxy or is behind NAT. Using
a proxy for syslog senders is extremely uncommon. Being behind NAT is
uncommon (usually, syslog is not transmitted to the public Internet).
The remaining threat I see is that someone on the same local network
poisons ARP with a spoofed IP address and they tries to fool the syslog
server in listening to it. While possible, I think this is also quite
remote (but remote is not a good argument when it comes to security, I
know). What matters more is that this attack will NOT work if the
subject's name is checked against the certificate.

So what is the extra benefit of authorizing based on IP address? What is
the advantage of it? Is that so important that every syslog application
implementing MUST support it? I am even in doubt if if justifies a
SHOULD. To me it looks MAY would be sufficient, and this is covered by
the text. So I think the whole paragraph on ipAddress authentication can
simply be removed.

As a side-note, authentication based on IP addresses is even
problematic. In my experience IP ranges are more likely to change than
names, so sticking with names reduces the administrative cost when a
change is needed.

Rainer
> 
> Tom Petch
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