[T2TRG] Proposed document: draft-amsuess-t2trg-raytime-01

Christian Amsüss <christian@amsuess.com> Wed, 12 July 2023 21:20 UTC

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Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2023 23:20:02 +0200
From: Christian Amsüss <christian@amsuess.com>
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Subject: [T2TRG] Proposed document: draft-amsuess-t2trg-raytime-01
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Hello T2TRG (because of its researchy character),
hello ACE (because this is applied to your ecosystem),

motivated by project requirements, I've written a draft[1] on how
devices without reliable Internet connectivity (and thus time source)
can deal with time limited tokens.

> Abstract:
>    When devices are deployed in locations with no real-time access to
>    the Internet, obtaining a trusted time for validation of time limited
>    tokens and certificates is sometimes not possible.  This document
>    explores the options for deployments in which the trade-off between
>    availability and security needs to be made in favor of availability.
>    While considerations are general, terminology and examples primarily
>    focus on the ACE framework.

The concept and trade-offs will not be surprising to many, but to my
knowledge they have not been written up. In addition, this document
lists the mechanisms a device can use to reject outdated tokens on a
best effort base.

I'd appreciate the group's input on the document, in particular in the
area of previous work there.

Best regards
Christian

PS. It's a -01 because Carsten already provided some fixes.

[1]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-amsuess-t2trg-raytime/


-- 
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