Re: [tcpinc] AD review of draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt
Daniel B Giffin <dbg@scs.stanford.edu> Fri, 29 September 2017 20:34 UTC
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Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 13:34:34 -0700
From: Daniel B Giffin <dbg@scs.stanford.edu>
To: Mirja Kühlewind <ietf@kuehlewind.net>
Cc: draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt.all@ietf.org, tcpinc <tcpinc@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <20170929203434.GA73214@scs.stanford.edu>
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Subject: Re: [tcpinc] AD review of draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt
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Hi Mirja (et al.), Below I've tried to address the concerns you last raised. We're ready to submit the tcpcrypt and ENO documents as soon as we're all happy with these last few details. Mirja wrote: > The assignment should only be made in one of the documents and I think this > one it the right one. So that should be removed from > draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno. Ok, great ... we will strip those assignments from ENO. > So in RFC793, if I recognize correctly, abort is rather something like a > silent close. Is this what you want, or would it make sense to send a reset? You're right, this wasn't clear. I've inserted this paragraph at the end of Section 3.3: Throughout this document, to "abort the connection" means to issue the "Abort" command as described in [RFC793], Section 3.8. That is, the TCP connection is destroyed, RESET is transmitted, and the local user is alerted to the abort event. > No, what I meant is maybe to say this: > > "A host MUST NOT resume with a session secret if it has already failed > to negotiated resumption in the past with the same secret, > in either role." > > Is that still what you wanted to say? If so, I think that's more clear. Not quite; I've changed the wording of that paragraph (in Section 3.5) to be more straitforward: A session secret may not be used to secure more than one TCP connection. To prevent this, a host MUST NOT resume with a session secret if it has ever enabled encryption in the past with the same secret, in either role. In the event that two hosts simultaneously send SYN segments to each other [...] Lastly, concerning FIN/FINp in Section 3.7: > I would rather state this the other way around: > > "If the TCP FIN is set (on the last segment), the sender MUST set the "FINp" > bit on the last frame that is send in that segment (unless it aborts the > connection). A sender MUST NOT set the "FINp" bit except when the TCP FIN > flag is set on the segment carrying that frame." > > I know that sounds a bit confusing and maybe you can phrase it better. The > point is you should not re-define (normatively) when the TCP FIN flag must > be set, as this is defined in RFC793 and it is not good practice to define > things twice in different documents. Got it. I've amended it to this, which avoids any redefinition of FIN usage: A sender MUST set the "FINp" bit on the last frame it sends in the connection (unless it aborts the connection), and on no other frame. A receiver MUST NOT report the end-of-file condition to the connection's local user until receiving a frame with the "FINp" bit set. If a host receives a segment with the TCP FIN flag set but the received datastream including this segment does not contain a frame with "FINp" set, the host SHOULD abort the connection and raise an error condition distinct from the end-of-file condition; however, if there are unacknowledged segments whose retransmission could potentially result in a valid frame, the host MAY instead drop the segment with the TCP FIN flag set. Does that seem better? d
- Re: [tcpinc] AD review of draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcr… Daniel B Giffin
- Re: [tcpinc] AD review of draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcr… Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF)
- Re: [tcpinc] AD review of draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcr… David Mazieres
- [tcpinc] AD review of draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF)
- Re: [tcpinc] AD review of draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcr… Daniel B Giffin
- Re: [tcpinc] AD review of draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcr… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: [tcpinc] AD review of draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcr… Black, David
- [tcpinc] new drafts of TCP-ENO and tcpcrypt Daniel B Giffin
- Re: [tcpinc] new drafts of TCP-ENO and tcpcrypt Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF)
- Re: [tcpinc] new drafts of TCP-ENO and tcpcrypt Gregorio Guidi
- Re: [tcpinc] new drafts of TCP-ENO and tcpcrypt dm-list-tcpcrypt
- Re: [tcpinc] new drafts of TCP-ENO and tcpcrypt iang
- [tcpinc] Making ECDHE-Curve25519 the only MTI for… David Mazieres
- Re: [tcpinc] Making ECDHE-Curve25519 the only MTI… Kyle Rose
- Re: [tcpinc] Making ECDHE-Curve25519 the only MTI… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: [tcpinc] Making ECDHE-Curve25519 the only MTI… Black, David
- Re: [tcpinc] Making ECDHE-Curve25519 the only MTI… Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF)
- [tcpinc] tcpcrypt MTI key exchange (speak now or … David Mazieres
- Re: [tcpinc] tcpcrypt MTI key exchange (speak now… Rene Struik
- Re: [tcpinc] tcpcrypt MTI key exchange (speak now… David Mazieres
- Re: [tcpinc] tcpcrypt MTI key exchange (speak now… iang
- Re: [tcpinc] tcpcrypt MTI key exchange (speak now… David Mazieres
- Re: [tcpinc] tcpcrypt MTI key exchange (speak now… iang
- Re: [tcpinc] tcpcrypt MTI key exchange (speak now… Gregorio Guidi