[tcpm] New I-D
Mahesh Jethanandani <mahesh@cisco.com> Sun, 21 October 2007 07:01 UTC
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Date: Sat, 20 Oct 2007 23:53:30 -0700
From: Mahesh Jethanandani <mahesh@cisco.com>
Organization: Cisco Systems Inc.
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Subject: [tcpm] New I-D
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A new version of an I-D has been posted on the IETF web site. http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mahesh-persist-timeout-02.txt "TCP Maintenance and Minor Extensions", Mahesh Jethanandani, Murali Bashyam, 27-Oct-07, <draft-mahesh-persist-timeout-02.txt> Abstract This document describes how a connection can remain infinitely in persist condition, and its Denial of Service (DoS) implication on the system, if there is no mechanism to recover from this anomaly. Summary: In this version of the draft, we have documented our experiment using a simple user level program to create the DoS scenario. The tests were run against both Apache and IIS HTTP servers. The test was run on a larger scale in the lab environment, where we were able to document the behavior of the servers. The test was then run against public and well known sites but on a smaller scale. Sniffer traces were captured to see the behavior of the connections. Our observations were that of the three well known public sites exhibited the DoS scenario. While site A had some mitigation technique in place, it was fairly easy to beat that. Site B and C had no mitigation in place and are currently vulnerable to the DoS attack. Solution: The draft documents some suggested solutions and describes why they are better than any of the techniques out there. In particular it talks about UTO and why UTO cannot solve this problem. It also talks about the role of applications and how they can help. Comments are welcome. /mahesh _______________________________________________ tcpm mailing list tcpm@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D Mark Allman
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D MURALI BASHYAM
- [tcpm] New I-D Mahesh Jethanandani
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D Wesley Eddy
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D David Malone
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D MURALI BASHYAM
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D (draft-mahesh-persist-timeout-… Fernando Gont
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D (draft-mahesh-persist-timeout-… MURALI BASHYAM
- RE: [tcpm] New I-D (draft-mahesh-persist-timeout-… Anantha Ramaiah (ananth)
- RE: [tcpm] New I-D (draft-mahesh-persist-timeout-… Fernando Gont
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D Mark Allman
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D MURALI BASHYAM
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D Fernando Gont
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D Mark Allman
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D MURALI BASHYAM
- RE: [tcpm] New I-D Caitlin Bestler
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D John Heffner
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D Mahesh Jethanandani
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D John Heffner
- Re: [tcpm] New I-D Mahesh Jethanandani
- [tcpm] New I-D Mahesh Jethanandani