Re: [tcpm] TCP Long Options
"Adam Langley" <agl@imperialviolet.org> Tue, 01 July 2008 18:27 UTC
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Date: Tue, 01 Jul 2008 11:28:04 -0700
From: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
To: Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu>
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Subject: Re: [tcpm] TCP Long Options
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On Tue, Jul 1, 2008 at 10:20 AM, Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu> wrote: > It might be worth reviewing the discussion on the TCP-LO when it was > previously presented, and provide a summary to the group as to whether > anything has changed. Good point, although I am probably omitting salient points which I missed when reviewing the archives: 1. It's a "non-optional option" / it's another 4 bytes of bloat Referring to the requirement that the LO option be included in every packet. This requirement has been removed for implementation reasons (it's very good to have a single fast path), but that also addresses this. (However, the LO option is still required to be the first option, if present and DO is required to be set to 6 in this case. I reasoned that it was still best to remove extra degrees of freedom about where to put it / how to set DO) 2. Some options can't be included in SLO This is still correct. There's no good way to negotiate some options, like MSS, if not included in the SYN packet so they cannot be moved to the SLO option. The draft doesn't discuss this, and possibly it should. Thinking about it, I might suggest that only options explicitly defined to be SLO compatible should be included in the SLO space. At the moment, that list might include just timestamps. (Consider a SYN with MD5: LO (4 bytes) + WScale (4 bytes) + MSS (4 bytes) + SACK perm + TS (12 bytes) + MD5 (20 bytes) > 40 bytes - so we can't even advertise LO in this case if we include TS in the SYN) 3. Three SACK blocks is sufficient This is probably true for the vast majority of the time. However, auth options esp reduce the number of possible SACK blocks when timestamps are included as well. So, although extra SACK space is probably a waste in packets with just a timestamp option, it can have it's uses 4. We could squeeze the options better Several suggestions concerning making better use of the options space were suggested like a binary flags option where timestamp permitted and SACK permitted could live, or making the timestamp option smaller in SYN packets. This would have been a great idea before these options were deployed, but there's really no good way to transition now that they have wide acceptance in their current form. However, possibly we should change that by defining that binary flags option right now and make LO the first user. If there's general acceptance of this, I'll happily write the drafts. 5. Other methods of extending the option space For example, making DO 5-bits wide or defining a scaling options for DO. None seemed to gather widespread acceptance. 6. There's no need / we're not running out of space Fundamentally, this objection is unaddressable by a long options draft :) I suggest that there is a need in the case of TCP-AO/MD5 to include SACK blocks. Additionally, the lack on long options hampers experimentation. Personally, I'm pushing this because I want to include an ECDH key exchange and need the extra options space. Others have certainly needed the same thing and by specifying it we can aid experimentation and encourage future TCP work which might not have happened otherwise. -- Adam Langley agl@imperialviolet.org http://www.imperialviolet.org _______________________________________________ tcpm mailing list tcpm@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm
- [tcpm] TCP Long Options Adam Langley
- Re: [tcpm] TCP Long Options Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] TCP Long Options Anantha Ramaiah (ananth)
- Re: [tcpm] TCP Long Options Adam Langley
- Re: [tcpm] TCP Long Options Eddy, Wesley M. (GRC-RCN0)[VZ]
- Re: [tcpm] TCP Long Options Caitlin Bestler
- Re: [tcpm] TCP Long Options Anantha Ramaiah (ananth)
- Re: [tcpm] TCP Long Options Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] TCP Long Options Adam Langley
- Re: [tcpm] TCP Long Options Joe Touch