Re: [tcpm] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-24
Wesley Eddy <wes@mti-systems.com> Fri, 03 September 2021 19:54 UTC
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To: Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>, tcpm IETF list <tcpm@ietf.org>
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From: Wesley Eddy <wes@mti-systems.com>
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Date: Fri, 03 Sep 2021 15:54:30 -0400
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Subject: Re: [tcpm] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-24
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Some proposals on how to address the SECDIR last call comments: On 7/30/2021 5:30 PM, Kyle Rose wrote: > > The one item I see missing from this section is a mention of lessons > learned > > and subsequently applied to the design of QUIC. I think it is worth > mentioning, > > for instance, that TCP's large surface area of cleartext metadata > exposes more > > information to the path than required to successfully route packets > to their > > destination, including to on-path adversaries that may be able to > use this > > metadata to bolster targeted or pervasive surveillance. It looks like this is covered pretty well in RFC 8546, which you mention below, so I think it might suffice for 793bis to just add a sentence noting pretty much exactly what you said above and referring interested readers to RFC 8546. > > There is one more omission, adjacent to (but not explicitly about) > security, > > that I think warrants some text in this document: that is around > ossification. > > Given the lengthy back-and-forth I witnessed as chair of the TCPINC WG > > regarding the (in)feasibility of protecting segmentation and header > values on > > the public internet, it is probably worth adding to a 793bis > document a section > > that briefly outlines the ossification impact of voluminous > cleartext and > > unprotected/un-GREASEd metadata, maybe with a reference to the wire > image as > > defined by RFC 8546. The reason I think this is worthwhile is that > it would be > > good to have the practical limits of TCP extensibility (i.e., in a > world with > > middleboxes and other deeply TCP-aware network elements) documented > where folks > > might look for it when thinking about new options or other new > functionality. I > > would be happy to help flesh out some text here. I don't really want to add a whole section for this, since we aren't going to actually change anything, however, I think it makes sense to add the above-mentioned reference to 8546, plus a little bit more expansion that references RFC 8558 as having additional recommendations that could be applied with regard to future TCP extensions. If this sounds okay, I can add a couple of sentences to the draft.
- [tcpm] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tcpm… Kyle Rose via Datatracker
- Re: [tcpm] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-… Wesley Eddy
- Re: [tcpm] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-… Kyle Rose
- Re: [tcpm] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-… Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: [tcpm] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-… Kyle Rose
- Re: [tcpm] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-… Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: [tcpm] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-… Wesley Eddy
- Re: [tcpm] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-… Kyle Rose
- Re: [tcpm] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-… Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: [tcpm] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-… Kyle Rose
- Re: [tcpm] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-… Martin Duke