Re: [therightkey] DNSNMC deprecates Certificate Authorities and fixes HTTPS security

[Rob Stradling <[e-mail]>]

On 16/12/13 14:31, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
<snip>
> That does not excuse
>
> 1) Failing to examine the issue when the DFN root accounted for half of
> the purported '600 CAs'
>
> 2) Continuing to count the DFN as 300 CAs when they know it is one.
>
> Putting out sloppy research and then failing to correct it when a
> mistake is committed is the problem. If someone publishes a flawed study
> I expect them to withdraw it when the errors are pointed out. I don't
> expect them to say that they are going to continue to publish a number
> they know is out by a factor of at least 2 because getting a correct
> number would be too much work.

FWIW, I suggested to Mozilla a few months ago that they could survey the 
CAs in order to find out the correct number (or, at least, a rather more 
accurate approximation!)

They seemed interested.

The conversation was somewhere in the middle of this thread...
http://mozilla.6506.n7.nabble.com/SSL-TLS-and-HTTPS-in-a-Post-Prism-Era-td294842.html

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online